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Estate Planning in the Nineties:
Friday the Thirteenth, Chapter 14:
Jason Goes to Washington-Part I*
By MARTIN D. BEGLEITER**
INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1970s, the topic of "estate freezing" has arisen m any
serious discussion of estate planning and has been widely analyzed m
estate planning literature Entire conferences and panel discussions are
* Copyright C 1993 by Martin D. Begleiter. All rights reserved.
** Richard M. and Anita Calkins Distingished Professor of Law, Drake Umversity Law School.
B.A. 1967, Umversity of Rochester, J.D. 1970, Cornell Umversity. The author wishes to express his
appreciation to Laurie A. Butler, Drake Umversity Law School, Class of 1993, for her valuable
assistance in the research and preparation of this Article.
' The articles are so numerous that providing a complete list would not be a realistic goal. A
small sample includes Byrle M. Abbin, Taling the Temperature of Asset Value Freeze Approaches:
What's Hot, hat's Not 66 TAXEs 3 (1988) [herinafter hat's Hot]; Byrle M. Abbin & James
Zu]cn, Have They Nuked the Freeze?, 19 U. MIAMI INSr. ON Esr. PLAN. 500 (1985) [hereinafter
Abbin & Zulin]; Byrle M. Abbin, The Value-Capping Cafetena-Selecting the Appropnate Freeze
Technique, 15 U. MIAMI INST. ON Esr. PLAN. 2000 (1981) [hereinafter Cafeteria]; Byrle M. Abbin,
The Partnership Capital Freeze: An Alternative to Corporate Recapitalization, 13 U. MIAMI INsr.
ON Esr. PLAN. 11800 (1979) [hereinafter Alternative]; Byrle M. Abbin, Gift, Estate and Income Tax
Exposure from Recapitalizing Closely Held Companies, 10 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1200
(1976); George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance,
77 COLum. L. REv. 161 (1977); Richard L. Dees, The Slaying of Frankensten's Monster: The Repeal
and Replacement of Section 2036(), 69 TAXES 151 (1991) [hereinafter MSaying]; Richard L. Dees,
Section 2036(c): The Monster That Ate Estate Planning and Installment Sales, Buy-Sell, Options,
Employment Contracts and Leases, 66 TAxEs 876 (1988) [hereinafter Monster]; The Estate Freezing
Rage: A Practical Look at Planning Opportunities and Potential Problems, 15 REAL PROP. PRon.
& T& J. 19 (1980) [hereinafter Rage]; Wayne M. Gazur, Congressional Diversions: Legislative
Responses to the Estate Valuation Freeze, 24 U.S.F. L. Rv. 95 (1989); Loins S. Harrison, The
Strategic Use ofLifetime Gifling Programs to Reduce Estate Taxes in Light of Recent Congressional
and Internal Revenue Service Antipathy Towards Transfer Tax Reduction Devices, 40 DEPAuL L.
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devoted to the topic Attorneys who practice m the area of estate planning
devote large amounts oftime to learning the techniques of estate freezing, and
recently the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service") and Congress have
devoted significant attention to the issue In 1990, Congress completely
revamped the rules for estate freezing by passing Chapter 14 of the Internal
Revenue Code (the "Code"), 4 engendering yet another round of discussion,
conferences and, presumably, soon-to-be-written articles.
Tis Article attempts to formulate some likely techniques of estate
planning that will evolve during the 1990s in the wake of Chapter 14, and
analyzes the changes made by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990 ("OBRA").5 Although in some cases a technical analysis of portions of
Chapter 14 will be required, this Article is not intended to be a detailed
explanation of Code sections 2701-2704. It is not intended to be a blueprint
for technical corrections to the Code or an analysis of every provision of
Chapter 14. It is intended to discuss the new provisions and to suggest some
estate planning techniques that will become prevalent during this decade. In
addition, this Article discusses the different approaches taken by Congress to
combat the perceived abuses in estate freezes, and evaluates the changes made
by Chapter 14, particularly those driven by Code section 2701.6 Before
proceeding, some background of the different situations attacked by OBRA
is necessary.
I. THE TYPICAL ESTATE FREEZE
In a typical estate freeze,7 the creator of a small business desires to
transfer ownership of the corporation to his children. He is often in his
sixties or seventies and, in many cases, wishes to slow down by relieving
himself of the day-to-day management of the business, or to otherwise
REV. 365 (1991); Hamlin C. King, Thus Spake the Commissioner: Advance Notice 89-99 and the
Scope of the Section 2036(c) Estate Freeze Ban, 68 TAxEs 3 (1990); John A. Wallace, An Overview
of Estate Freezing Techniques and Attendant Estate and Gift Tax Problems, 15 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. i. 71 (1980).
See infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
Congress' first attempt at legislation was the enactment of I.RIC. § 2036(c) (1992), which was
enacted in 1987. See infra notes 35, 80-136 for an analysis of § 2036(c). Section 2036(c) was
repealed retroactively, and replaced by Chapter 14, I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704, enacted by Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act §§ 11601(a), (c), 11602, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified at I.R.C.
§§ 2701-2704 (1992)).
' Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 § 11602, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(codified at I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (1992)) [hereinafter OBRA].
'Id.
'I.R.C. § 2701 (1992); see also infra notes 167-93 and accompanying text.
This description is based upon the common framework of an estate freeze. See, eg., Cafeteria,
supra note 1, 2003, at 20-12.
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decrease the amount of his work. One method available to accomplish the
estate freeze is to reorganize the capital structure of the corporation.9 If one
class of common stock exists, a new preferred stock is created. If the younger
generation transferees are not already shareholders, the creator exchanges his
common shares for common and preferred. He then makes gifts of the
common stock to the children and retains the preferred stock. If the children
are already shareholders, the creator exchanges his common stock for
preferred stock and the children either retain their common stock or exchange
it for new common shares of equal value. The preferred stock is designed so
that its value closely approximates or equals the current value of the
corporation. This enables the creator to give the common stock to his children
at a low gift tax cost, sheltering the gifts from tax under the annual exclu-
sion 0 or, at worst, using a small amount of the unified credit.1 The
preferred stock, because of its fixed redemption price,'2 is fixed in value for
estate tax purposes. As a result, the common shares will absorb all of the
future appreciation of the corporation. 3 By carving out of the corporate
stock different rights such as control, income, present value and future
appreciation,' 4 and transferng them to different members of the family
group, the estate freeze caps the value of the present interest retained by the
older generation, and all future appreciation (and either present or future
control) is transferred to the younger generation with no or minimal transfer
tax costs. 5 Similar techniques are available for partnerships and usually
involve the creation of limited partnership interests.'6
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FREEZE UNTIL 1987
A. The Early Years-Until 1977
There are significant non-tax reasons for engaging m a corporate
reorganization with the creator retaining only preferred stock, or in some
' There may be non-tax in addition to tax reasons for doing this. See mfra notes 20-24 and
accompanying text.
' This will allow the nuimrization of the effect of the gift tax upon the children receiving the
corporation. See mfra note 10 and accompanying text.
" I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1992). This excludes amounts received from any person each year that are
less than S10,000 from the definition of taxable gifts. Id.
" Id. § 2505. This provision of the Code allows for a lifetime "credit against the [gift] tax" of
S192,800. Id. § 2505(a). The credit is equivalent to an exclusion of $600,000 of gifts.
, See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FuNDAmENTAtS OF MODERN BuSinESS 351 (1989).
This description is adapted from Cafetena, supra note 1, 2003, at 20-12.
"Abbin & Zun, supra note 1, 501.1, at 5-6. For examples of such provisions that may be
used in an estate freeze to bolster value while serving to perfect a freeze, see mfjra notes 190-93, 277-
306 and accompanying text.
, See id.
"See Alternative, supra note 1, 1801-2, at 18-8.
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cases a small amount of common stock m addition to the preferred stock,
and passing the common stock on to children and grandchildren. 7 The
creator may use an estate freeze to pass the business to succeeding
generations so as to avoid being forced to sell all or part of the business
to an outside concern in order to meet estate tax obligations. The
orderly passing of family wealth to future generations is also a common
goal. When control is passed to the younger generation during the client's
lifetime, having the creator present to advise the new owners greatly
reduces the time necessary for the younger generation owners to learn the
business and prevents costly mistakes and errors. The overlap of
generational control, m addition to reducing the "learning curve" of the
new owners, often allows the business to recover from the change in
management more quickly.'9
Apparently, the concept of utilizing a change in the corporate capital
structure to effect an estate freeze was used to some extent by practi-
tioners as early as the late 1940s and was commented on in estate
planning literature during the 1950s." The only response by the Service
during this period was Revenue Ruling 59-60,2" which was very general
in nature and focused on the valuation of closely held or unlisted
stock.' One article has stated that the ruling "offers statements that most
experienced practitioners of estate value freezing have always acknowl-
edged."
" For example, the shareholders of a close corporation may wish to insure that voting power
passes in an orderly fashion to those members of the younger generation who actively participate in
the business. This rationale has been accepted by the courts to support a finding of a valid business
purpose withnn the context of an I.R-C. § 368(a)(1)(E) (1992) recapitalization. See, eg., Dean v.
Conussioner, 10 T.C. 19 (1948).
" BNATAX MANAGEMENr PORTFOLIO, SINGLE ENTiTY REORGANIZATIONS: RECAPITALIZATIONS
AND F REORGANizATIONs A-38 to 39 (1993).
"IThere are a variety of other non-tax reasons to desire an estate freeze. For example, the
retinng client may seek to ensure a source of income during retirement, to encourage family
participation in the business, to ensure the continued existence of the business, or to provide
increased liquidity to the client's estate. See Cafeteria, supra note 1, 2001, at 20-9 to 20-10.
See Wayne M. Gazur, supra note 1, at 112-13 (citing Samuel . Foosaner, Stockholder Estate
Problems, 92 TL & Esr. 908, 908 (1953)).
" Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, as modified by Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2 C.B. 370, as
amplified by Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319, and Rev. Rul. 80-213, 1980-2 C.B. 102.
See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-I C.B. 237.
Abbin & Zulon, supra note 1, 502.5, at 5-16. These authors considered the following as
important factors to consider when valuing preferred stock:
1. The most important factors to be considered in determining the value of preferred stock
are voting rights, dividend coverage, and protection of liquidation preference.
2. These factors for closely held preferred stock are to be compared with the same factors
for igh grade, publicly traded preferred stock. Such comparisons need to take into
account the adequacy of yields, the capability of dividend coverage, the prior and
projected income flow, and the evaluation of the actual dividend rate assurance through
[Vol. 81
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Nonetheless, during the 1950s the appearance of articles on this topic
was infrequent and restricted mainly to journals specializing m estate
planning. No significant cases focused the attention of the public or
academia on the subject.
B. 1977-Estate Freezing Enters the Mainstream
In 1977, Professor George Cooper of Columbia Law School authored
an article that quickly brought estate freezes to the forefront.24 Using the
first important case involving a recapitalizatones as an example,
Professor Cooper broadly criticized the technique as a serious evasion of
the estate and gift tax.26 Professor Cooper presumed that the preferred
stock was valued at the full value of the corporation at the time of the
recapitalization and that the new common stock had a negligible value,
and went on to state:
In other words, he froze ns own estate, and, at the same time, achieved
the triple goals of sopusticated estate plannig-no loss of control, no
current gift tax, and ability to pass on the future benefits of his business
acumen free of tax. Moreover, since he retained voting control in the
corporation he had the power to decide how much benefit the common
shareholders received and when they received it.'
Cooper noted that the only drawback of the preferred stock recapitaliza-
tion technique to the parent was that the corporation was burdened with
a heavy preferred dividend due to the high dividend rate required to make
the value of the preferred stock equal to the value of the corporation, and
that the parent who retained the preferred collected a large amount of
past experience and future projections of income coverage. In addition, determination of
whether or not the dividends are cumulative, without which the value is depressed, is
imperative Moreover, the ruling refers to whether or not the full liquidating
preference is likely to be paid based on risk of asset protection.
3. Other factors mentioned in the ruling are the presence or absence of voting rights and,
if preferred has voting control, peculiar covenants or provisions not found in publicly
traded stocks should be considered Obviously absent in tins ruling are references to
many other facts of preferred stock ownership that may be pertinent, such as convertibility
rights, i.e., the "bells and whistles" that help sustain appraisals that value a preferred stock
at its par or stated value.
Id. at 5-16 to 5-17.
Cooper, supra note 1.
Estate of Salsbury, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1441 (1975). In this case, the taxpayer attempted to have
it all by maintaining control of the corporation while avoiding the impact of the gift tax. Id.
2 Cooper, supra note 1, at 164.
"Id. at 173.
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ordinary income that had previously been taxed at the corporate
level." Cooper believed that this problem had deterred many
recapitalizations, but that "[o]ther practitioners are, however, willing
to try a lower dividend rate or even risk a noncumulative dividend to
mitigate [the] burden [of the income tax]." 9 Professor Cooper
further noted that use of a dual stock structure was a more common
and significant technique of estate freezing" in new corporations
than in existing corporations, and that the technique offered possibili-
ties for use in a holding company when the company's capital
structure included more than one class of stock for investments other
than businesses.3'
To rectify this situation, and others he discussed, Professor
Cooper recommended:
(1) Adopting stricter means of valuating common stock inter-
ests;32
(2) Postponing the taxability of the gift until the value of the common
stock is more clearly established;3
(3) Rethinking minority discounts m family gift situations," and
generally broadening the range of facts considered on lack of marketabi-
lity and other discounts; 5
(4) Enacting statutes limiting marketability and blockage discounts,
incorporating attribution rules into valuation determination and strictly
limiting discounts; 3 6
(5) Changing I.RC. sections 2036 and 2038 to provide that the
retention of the power to manage and select the manager of a business
(including a partnership) by any method, including voting or contract
rights, would be a retention of a power to affect the beneficial enjoyment
under I.R.C. section 2036(a)(2) or a power to alter or amend under
section 2038; 7
' Id. at 175. Curiously, Professor Cooper, although mentionnig annual exclusion gifts, id. at 191-
92, 211, failed to emphasize the additional tax avoidance possibility of combining the recapitalization
with gifts of at least some of the preferred stock to the younger generation each year and thus totally
avoiding tax on these gifts by virtue of the $3,000 (now $10,000) annual exclusion under I.R.C. §
2503 (1992).
Id. at 175.
"Id. at 176.
31Id.
:2 Id. at 225.
Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 226.
"Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 231-32.
" Id. at 237.
[Vol. 81
ESTATE PLANNING IN THE NINETIES
(6) Amending 1.1LC. sections 2036 and 2038 to cover sales to family
members where a parent retains an interest in the property; 
38
(7) Applying similar rules to new business ventures owned by
children but controlled by parents; 39 and
(8) Substituting a periodic net wealth tax for the estate and gift
taxes.
40
C. The Debate Phase. 1977-1987
Professor Cooper's article did what few other tax articles have
done-it served to galvanize debate on a particular estate tax planning
technique. In the ten years following the Cooper article, numerous articles
on estate freezing appearedL4' In light of recent legislation, perhaps none
of these articles is more important than a reprint of a panel discussion
held at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting on August 14,
1979.42 This meeting brought together five of the leading estate planners
from all areas of the country, each an-expert in a certain area of estate
freezing.43 The insights resulting from the panel discussion are incredible
in light of Chapter 14. To summarize the views of the ABA panel, in the
typical estate freezing recapitalization:
(1) The common stock should be allocated a value of at least ten
percent of the value of the corporation;"
"Id. at 238.
"Id. at 240.
" Id. at 244-47. The fate of some of these proposals will be discussed later in this Article. See
mfra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
, See sources cited supra note i.
,' Rage, supra note 1. The repnnt included the outlines of the participants. In the order of
publication, the outlines are: John A. Wallace, An Overview of Estate Freezing Techniques and
Attendant Estate and Gift Tax Problems, 15 REAL PRop. PROB. & TR. J. 71 (1980); John R. Cohan,
Outline on Recapitalizations and Holding Companies, 15 REAL PRoP. PROB. & Ta. J. 81 (1980);
William E. Collins, Outline on Estate Planning Alternatives to Recapitalizations and Holding
Companies for Closely Held Family Corporations, 15 REAL PRop. PROB. & Th. J. 88 (1980);
William F. Nelson, The Partnership Capital Freeze, A Precis, 15 R R P OP. PROB. & Ta. J. 99
(1980); and Robert M. Meyers, Outline on Valuation Problems in Estate Freezing Techniques, 15
REAL PROp. PROB. & TR. 3. 112 (1980).
,' These five experts were John R. Cohan, William E. Collins, Robert M. Meyers, William F.
Nelson and John A. Wallace.
" Rage, supra note 1, at 36 (comments of John R. Cohan). John R. Cohan of Irell & Manella,
Los Angeles, explained the reason for this position as follows:
First of all, suppose the Smiths say- "We have consulted nine appraisers and they all
agree that The Hub Company is worth $i million, so you can assume that is correct; what
we would like to do is to issue S999,000 worth of preferred and $1,000 worth of common
and give the common away to our children under the annual exclusion you have told us
about-in fact, we can give some cash in addition because tis recapitalization notion is
such a great deal." I don't believe we can follow this plan and I don't think many people
1992-93]
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(2) Giving the preferred a greatly depressed dividend rate makes the
preferred have a value substantially less than par;45
(3) The dividend should be at least partially cumulative and hopefully
entirely cumulative if it is desired that the preferred have a value equal
to a substantial portion of the value of the company;46
(4) Pay the dividend. If the company is not likely to pay the dividend,
or if the owners do not intend to pay the dividend, the value of the
preferred will be substantially diluted;47
(5) A high dividend rate will not significantly bolster the value of the
preferred if the preferred is weak in the first place;4'
(6) Voting power will improve the value of the preferred. The
question here becomes whether the company has the capacity to redeem
the stock if the voting preferred, which has control, decides to have the
stock called.49
who are active in this field of law believe that you can. One of the features of preferred
stock is that it has priority in liquidation. It is protected against loss to some extent
because the common stock absorbs the loss before the preferred does. That is why
someone is willing to take only a fixed income position in the corporation without hope
of capital appreciation. If there is only 1 percent, or 0.01 percent protection for the
preferred by having a $1,000 common stock cushion in a $1 million corporation, the
slightest loss would damage the preferred. As a practical matter, there is no protection for
the preferred in this case at all. Moreover, there is no assurance that there will be a
substantial ability to pay any dividends on the preferred. There is no pat answer to the
question of what the proper cusluon for the preferred should be; clearly, it is more than
1 percent or 0.1 percent. I suggest at least 10 percent.
Id. (emphasis added.) The other panelists agreed. See id. at 50-51, 54-56.
, Id. at 56. This price at a discount to par results because valuation of preferred stock is a
function of the dividend rate that is fixed and the rate of return required by investors when
purchasing securities of a similar nature and risk. See EuGENE F. BRIGHAM, FUNDAMENTALS OF
FN cAIAL MANAGEMENT 208 (5th ed. 1989).
46 Rage, supra note 1, at 56. One panelist used a partially cumulative and partially noncumula-
tive dividend. The cumulative dividend was 4% and the noncumulative dividend was set at a rate to
bring the total dividend to 2% above the prime rate. Id. at 37-38. Cumulative dividends are important
sources of value because, unlike noncumulative dividends, unpaid cumulative dividends carry forward
to the next year. BRIGHAM, supra note 45, at 522. But it is important to note that "if the
noncumulative dividend for a voting preferred is set at a decent rate and if the holder in fact controls,
through the vote of the preferred, the payment of that dividend, it should be irrelevant for valuation
purposes that no portion of the dividend is cumulative." Rage, supra note 1, at 49 (comments of
William F. Nelson). As we shall see, however, this is the one conclusion of the panel that is not
accurate under I.R.C. § 2701 if the election is made. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
" Rage, supra note 1, at 37, 56 (comments of Robert M. Meyers). If investors do not expect the
company to pay a dividend, an investor's required rate of return is going to increase, thus driving the
price of the stock down. In this case, such a result is driven by an expectation that causes the stock
to be associated with a greater level of risk. For a discussion of the relationship between required
returns and risk aversion, see BRIGHAM, supra note 45, at 113-14.
" Rage, supra note I, at 56 (comments of Robert M. Meyers).
49 Id. at 56-57. It is nonetheless important to avoid malong the preferred security too complex,
as preferred stock is like a Christmas tree. "The tree is simple. It has straight lines and it is easy to
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In sum, leading attorneys and valuation experts in the field of estate
planning durng this conference recommended a very cautious approach
to estate freezing. They did not approve of putting too many ornaments0
on the tree,5 and argued that at least a partially cumulative dividend that
would be paid was desirable.52
Given the conservative principles advocated by the most sophisticated
of the estate freeze experts, one must wonder if there were any significant
abuses to correct. In light of these suggestions, it is interesting that m any
discussion of estate freezing abuses, a bogeyman is always mentioned.
These "bogeymen!' are unnamed attorneys who are willing to go beyond
the recommendations of the experts. For example, Professor Cooper
stated:
A more senous drawback to a preferred stock recapitalization, and the
only significant reason given by any of our interviewees for not
undertaking one in almost every closely held corporation situation
is that the corporation becomes loaded with a heavy preferred dividend
requirement and the parent finds himself the recipient of a large amount
of ordinary income which has already been taxed at the corporate level.
In order for the dividend to have credibility, more cautious practitioners
seem to believe it should be cumulative and fixed at a rate somewhat
lugher than the going rate on similar stock issued by listed corporations,
which may get into double figures [during] times of high interest rates.
Tus dividend problem seems to have deterred many recapitalizations in
recent years. Other practitioners are, however, willing to try a lower
dividend rate or even risk a noncumulative dividend to mitigate its
burdenY
Similarly, the panel discussion used hypotheticals of corporate owners
who wanted to go beyond the safe guidelines laid down by the panel.'
In an article published some years later, another author agreed, stating
that he had "noted for several years many planners have been careless
understand. But then we start to put ornaments on this Christmas tree. If you insist on putting
so many ornaments on this tree that it is not possible to value it, you are exposing your client to a
significant risk." Id. at 54. Furthermore, the form of the recapitalization should always rest on a firm,
practical basis as the client may have to live with it a long time. rd. at 58.
' Id. at 54.
S Or, as one of the experts put it: "That is an example of the tax principle that pigs get fat and
hogs get slaughtered." Rage, supra note 1, at 50 (comments of John A. Wallace) (referring to the
potential impact of an overly aggressive estate freeze).
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Cooper, supra note 1, at 175 (emphasis added).
"Rage, supra note 1, at 36, 54-56 (comments of Robert L. Meyers).
1992-93]
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with the substance of freezes and have ignored the valuation problems
inherent in using the risky 'estate planner's preferred'-a 6 percent
noncumulative, nonredeemable, nonputtable, nonconvertible, nonvoting
preferred stock."55 This hypothetical, and others, served as the basis for
a movement in favor of legislating reform.
D. The Early Legislative Proposals
As noted in the last subsection, Professor Cooper's article" stimu-
lated debate on estate freezmg.Y In addition, the article set the focus for
the Service's attempts to restrict estate freezing techniques legislatively.'
A number of suggestions for tax reform that were made over the next ten
years affected valuation, although some of them impacted estate freezing
only tangentially 59
The 1984 Treasury Proposals represented the fist significant reform
effort." These proposals suggested that minority and fractional share
discounts m gift and estate tax valuations be limited and that such
interests be valued as a pro rata share of the fair market value of the
portion of the asset owned by the donor or decedent." Prior gifts of
fractional interests in the asset, in addition to fractional interests of the
donor's spouse, would be attributed to the donor or decedent.' The rule
would apply only if the donor retained a fractional interest after the gift,
or if the donor had previously made a gift of a fractional interest in the
asset, and would be used to determine whether a sale to a related party
was a transfer for adequate consideration.63 While this proposal did not
" What's Hot, supra note 1, at 8; see also, Gazur, supra note 1, at 115-16 n.97 (using
hypothetical to demonstrate tax avoidance potential of recapitalization).
Cooper, supra note 1.
See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
"As one participant in the panel discussion of the Section of Real Propeiy, Probate and Trust
Law of the ABA stated:
Professor Cooper wrote an article that described all of the bright new techniques that
smart lawyers are using to euchre the Treasury out of transfer taxes. So if you want a road
map of where the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service are going to seek legislative
relief over the next ten years, just read tins article, because, believe you mej people in the
Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service have read it.
Rage, supra note 1, at 32 (comments of John A. Wallace).
See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
U.S. DEPT. OF THE TRAsuRy, 2 TAX REFoRM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLIcrry AND ECONOMIC
GRowTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1984) [hereinafter TREASURY
REPORT].
Id. at 386-87.
,Id. at 387.
Id.
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directly affect estate freezes, as it was limited to minority and fractional
discounts, the attribution and retention rules of the proposal were harbingers
of things to come."
The President's tax proposa 5 had no provisions affecting estate
freezing. At the request of the Treasury Department, the Section of Taxation
of the American Bar Association appointed a task force to study transfer tax
reform. The Task Force Report" stated that so-called lapsing votes at
death should be valued on the basis of the powers the decedent retained
until Is death. As to Treasury proposals on minority and fractional
share discounts," the Task Force Report took no position on the ground
that the intended result of the application of the proposals under various
fact patterns was unclear."' On most of the situations considered by the
Task Force, the members were divided. Furthermore, the Task Force
focused little attention on estate freezes and buy-sell agreements, noting
only that regulations could be promulgated to discourage the use of such
techniques when they are, in effect, testamentary substitutes.71 While
neither the proposal of the President nor the Task Force Report was
enacted, they set the stage for the first attempt to use legislative means
to control estate freezes.
Ill. SECTION 2036(c): NIGHTMARE ON CONSTITUTION AVENUE
By 1987 Congress was ready to act. The staffs of the Joint Committee
on Taxation and the House Ways and Means Comrmttee prepared a
description of revenue raising options!' Included in this list were proposals
to include in the gross estate the value of the common stock trans-
ferred in a recapitalization.73 In addition, the committee proposed the
elimination of minority discounts.74 Both proposals were included in
"See mnfra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
"RONALD W. REAGAN, THE PRESIDErr'S TAx PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS,
GROWTH, AND SIMPLIcrry (1985).
" Task Force on Transfer Tax Restnsctunng, Report on Transfer Tax Restructunng, A.B.A. SEc.
TAXATION, repnnted in 41 TAX LAw. 395 (1988) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
Id. at 420-21. Tis is a recommendation to reverse Estate of Hamson v. Comm r, 52 TCM
(CCH) 1306 (1987), which was accomplished by the enactment of I.R.C. § 2704 (1991).
"See supra notes 60-63 and acconpanying text.
"Task Force Report, supra note 66, at 422.
"Id. at 423.
Id. at 424.
"STAF OF THE JOINT COMMnITEE ON TAXATION AND THE COMMITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
100th CONG., 1st SESS., DIESCIPIoN OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO INCREASE REVENUES PREPARED FOR
THE COMMrIT ON WAYS AND MEANS 265-67 (Comm. Prnt 1987).
I Id. at 266.
7"Id.
1992-93]
546 KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 81
a House bill.75 The House Report, after describing a preferred stock
recapitalization and a classic partnership freeze, stated that "[t]he
committee believes that keeping a preferred stock interest in an
enterprise while giving away the common stock resembles a retained
life estate, and should be treated as such."76 The Senate's version of
the bill omitted both proposals.' In conference, the minority dis-
count provision was dropped and the estate freezing provision
enacted."
Section 2036(c)" was a grade-B horror show The statute
basically provided that if a person who holds a substantial interest in
an enterprise transfers property that has a disproportionately large
share of the potential appreciation in the interest in the enterprise, and
retains a disproportionately large share in the income of, or the rights
in, the enterprise, the retention is treated as a retention of the enjoyment
of the transferred property and thus included in the transferor's gross
estate."0 There are a number of significant words and concepts in section
H.R. 3545, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
7, H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 1043 (1987).
See S. 1920, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987).
"OBRA, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10402, 101 Stat. 1330. The Revenue Act of 1987 was one part
of OBRA. See Monster, supra note 1, at 876.
I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1987).
I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1987), as enacted by OBRA, provided.
(c) Inclusion Related to Valuation Freezes.-
(1) In general-For purposes of subsection (a), if-
(A) any person holds a substantial interest in an enterprise, and
(B) such person in effect transfers after December 17, 1987, property having
a disproportionately large share of the potential appreciation in such person's
interest in the enterprise while retamng a disproportionately large share in the
income of, or rights in, the enterprise, then the retention of the retained interest
shall be considered to be a retention of the enjoyment of the transferred
property.
(2) Special rule for sales to family members.-The exception contained in subsection
(a) for a bona fide sale shall not apply to a transfer described in paragraph (1) if
such transfer is to a member of the transferor's family.
(3) Definitions.-For purposes of this subsection-
(A) Substantial interest-A person holds a substantial interest in an enterprise
if such person owns (directly or indirectly) 10 percent or more of the voting
power or income stream, or both, in such enterprise. For purposes of the
preceding sentence, an individual shall be treated as owning any interest in an
enterprise which is owned (directly or indirectly) by any member of such
individual's family.
(B) Family-The term "family" means, with respect to any individual, such
individual's spouse, any lineal descendant of such individual or of such
individual's spouse, any parent or grandparent of such individual, and any
spouse of any of the foregoing. For purposes of the preceding sentence, a
relationship by legal adoption shall be treated as a relationslp by blood.
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2036(c). These include "substantial interest, ' '.. "enterprise," "in effect
transfer, " "disproportionately large, "" "potential appreciation,""
"family,"' "interest In the enterprise," 7 and "rights."' Of these, only
"substantial interest" '89 and "family""se are defined in the statute. Even
though in the legislative history "enterprise," 9' "transfers,"92 "dispropor-
tionately large share of potential appreciation" '93 and "rights"'94 are
defined, several of these definitions are so vague as to be meaningless,
while others, as defined, serve to include almost every estate planning
transaction in the gross estate.95
It quickly became apparent that section 2036(c) was inadequate to
deal with the perceived problem and uncertain in scope."5 As a result,
major changes were made in the statute in 1988. Furthermore, it is
interesting to note the elaboration on what the statute was to accomplish
found in the legislative history.
Section 2036(c) is directed at two concerns. The first is that the
creation or transfer of disproportionate interests in a business or other
(C) Treatment of spouse.-An individual and such individual's spouse shall be
treated as 1 person.
(4) Coordination with section 2035.-For purposes of applying section 2035, any
transfer of the retained interest referred to in paragraph (1) shall be treated as a
transfer of an interest in the transferred property referred to in paragraph (1).
(5) Coordination with section 2043.-In lieu of applying section 2043, appropriate
adjustments shall be made for the value of the retained interest.
"Id. § 2036(c)(IXA).
"Id. § 2036(cXIXA)-(B).
"Id. § 2036(c)(1)(B).
U Id.
SId.
Id. § 2036(c)(2).
"Id. § 2036(c)(1)(B).
"Id.
Id. § 2036(cX3XA).
"Id. § 2036(c)(3)(B).
"Enterprise is defined in the legislative nstory as "includ[ing] a business or other property
which may produce income or gain." H.R. RE'. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Seass. 996, repnnted in
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1245, 1742.
" "Transfer" is defined in the legislative history as follows: "A transfer encompasses, but is not
limited to, all transactions whereby property is passed to or conferred upon another, regardless of the
means or device employed in its accomplishment." Id.
" "[D]isproportionately large share of potential appreciation" is defined in the legislative history
as "any share of appreciation in the enterprise greater than the share of appreciation bome by the
property retained by the transferor." Id.
' "Rights" is defined as follows: "Rights in the enterprise include voting rights, conversion
rights, liquidation rights, warrants, options, and other rights of value." Id.
" Tis is particularly true of the definitions of "enterprise" and "transfer." See supra notes 91-
92.
" See Monster, supra note 1, at 877; see also Gazur, supra note 1, at 123.
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property often allows the transfer of wealth outside the transfer tax
system, either because of undervaluation at the time of the effective
transfer or because of action or inaction of the transferor or transferee
after that transfer.
The second concern underlying section 2036(c) is that, by retaining
a disproportionate share of the income of, or rights in, an enterprise, the
transferor in fact retains enjoyment of the whole enterprise. The transfer
is incomplete at the time of the initial transfer, and if enjoyment is
retained until death, the transfer is testamentary in nature. '
This invocation of undervaluation is new to section 2036(c), although
it is not new to the discussion of estate freezes." Clearly, if section
2036(c) was going to satisfy these new concerns, changes were necessary.
In the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 ("TAMRA"),"
Congress tried to solve some of the problems with the statute in two
ways-clarifying some of the provisions and providing safe harbors.' 0
" S. REP. No. 445, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 526-27 (1989), repnnted m 1988 U.S.C.C.AN. 4515,
5028-29. Indeed, the report spent more time on the problem of undervaluation than on retention of
enjoyment. On the former issue, the report stated in part:
Undervaluation may occur because the transferor claims a value for the transferred
property lower than its fair market value. Undervaluation may result from the transferor
granting a person a long-term option to purchase property at a fixed price.
Creation of disproportionate interests in property also permits the transfer of wealth
free of transfer tax through the subsequent exercise or nonexercise of rights with respect
to the enterprise. Even if the transferred property is properly valued at the time of the
initial transfer, wealth may be transferred thereafter if the rights are not exercised in an
ann's length manner. This may occur if, after the transfer, either transferor or transferee
acts or fails to act or causes the enterprise to act or fail to act. For example, wealth may
pass from a preferred shareholder to a common shareholder if the corporation fails to pay
dividends to the preferred shareholder. Or, by exercising conversion, liquidation, put or
voting rights in other than ann's length fashion (or by not exercising such rights before
they lapse), the transferor may transfer part or all of the value of such rights. Even if such
exercise or non-exercise results in a gift, which is uncertain, it is virtually impossible for
the I.R.S. to monitor all post-transfer action or inaction with respect to such rights.
Id. at 5029.
"See Monster, supra note 1, at 877.
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, § 3031, Pub. L. No. 100-674, 102 Stat.
3342 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1988)).
" As revised, I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1989) provided.
(c) Inclusion related to valuation freezes.-
(1) In general.-For purposes of subsection (a), if-
(A) any person holds a substantial interest in an enterprise, and
(B) such person in effect transfers after December 17, 1987, property having
a disproportionately large share of the potential appreciation in such person's
interest in the enterprise while retaining an interest in the income of, or rights
in, the enterprise,
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then the retention of the retained interest shall be considered to be a retention of the
enjoyment of the transferred property.
(2) Special rules for consideration furnished by family members-
(A) In general-The exception contained in subsection (a) for a bona fide sale
shall not apply to a transfer described in paragraph (1) if such transfer is to a
member of the transferor's family.
(B) Treatment of consideration.-
(i) In general-In the case of a transfer described in paragraph (1), if-
(I) a member of the transferor s family provides consideration in
money or money's worth for such member's interest in the enter-
pnsei and
(M it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that such
consideration originally belonged to such member and was never
received or acquired (directly or indirectly) by such member from
the transferor for less than full and adequate consideration in
money or money's worth,
paragraph (1) shall not apply to the applicable fraction of the portion of the
enterprise which would (but for this subparagraph) have been included in the
gross estate of the transferor by reason of this subsection (determined without
regard to any reduction under paragraph (5) for the value of the retained
interest).
(ii) Applicable fraction.-For purposes of clause (i), the applicable
fraction is a fraction-
(I) the numerator of which is the amount of the consideration
referred to in clause (i), and
(II) the denominator of which is the value of the portion referred to
in clause (i) immediately after the transfer described in paragraph
(1).
(iii) Section 2043 not to apply--The provisions of this subparagraph shall
be in lieu of any adjustment under section 2043.
(3) Definitions.-For purposes of this subsection-
(A) Substantial interest-A person holds a substantial interest in an enterprise
if such person owns (directly or indirectly) 10 percent or more of the voting
power or income stream, or both, in such enterprise. For purposes of the
preceding sentence, an individual shall be treated as owning any interest in an
enterprise which is owned (directly or indirectly) by any member of such
individual's family.
(B) Fanily-The term 'Tamily" means, with respect to any individual, such
individual's spouse, any lineal descendant of such individual or of such
individual's spouse, any parent or grandparent of such individual, and any
spouse of any of the foregoing. For purposes of the preceding sentence, a
relationship by legal adoption shall be treated as a relationship by blood.
(C) Treatment of spouse.-Except as provided in regulations, an individual and
such individual's spouse shall be treated as 1 person.
(4) Treatment of certain transfers.
(A) In general-For purposes of this subtitle, if, before the death of the original
transferor-
(i) the original transferor transfers all (or any portion of) the retained
interest referred to in paragraph (1), or
(ii) the original transferee transfers all (or any portion of) the transferred
property referred to in paragraph (1) to a person who is not a member of
the original transferor's family,
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the original transferor shall be treated as having made a transfer by gift of
property to the original transferee equal to the paragraph (1) inclusion (or
proportionate amount thereof). Proper adjustments shall be made in the amount
treated as a gift by reason of the preceding sentence to take into account prior
transfers to which this subparagraph applied and take into account any right
of recovery (whether or not exercised) under section 2207B.
(B) Coordination with paragraph (1).-In any case to wich subparagraph (A)
applies, nothing in paragraph (1) or section 2035(d)(2) shall require the
inclusion of the transferred property (or proportionate amount thereof).
(C) Special rule where property retransferred.-In the case of a transfer
described in subparagraph (A)(ii) from the original transferee to the original
transferor, the paragraph (1) inclusion (or proportion thereof) shall be reduced
by the excess (if any) of-
(i) the fair market value of the property.so transferred, over
(ii) the amount of the consideration paid by the original transferor in
exchange for such property.
(D) Definitions.-For purposes of this paragraph-
(i) Original transferor.-The term "original transferor" means the person
making the transfer referred to in paragraph (1).
(ii) Original transferee.-The term "original transferee" means the person
to whom the transfer referred to in paragraph (1) is made. Such term
includes any member of the original transferor's family to whom the
property is subsequently transferred.
(iii) Paragraph (1) incluson.-The term "paragraph (1) inclusion" means
the amount winch would have been included in the gross estate of the
original transferor under subsection (a) by reason of paragraph (I)
(determined without regard to sections 2032 and 2032A) if the original
transferor died immediately before the transfer referred to in subpara-
graph (A). The amount determined under the preceding sentence shall be
reduced by the amount (if any) of the taxable gift resulting from the
transfer referred to in paragraph (1)(B).
(iv) Transfers to include terminations, etc.-Terrmnations, lapses, and
other changes in any interest in property of the original transferor or
original transferee shall be treated as transfers.
(E) Continuing interest in transferred property may not be retamed.-A transfer
(to which subparagraph (A) would otherwise apply) shall not be taken into
account under subparagraph (A) if the original transferor or original transferee
(as the case may be) retans a direct or indirect continuing interest in the
property transferred in such transfer.
(5) Adjustments.-Appropnate adjustments shall be made in the amount included in
the gross estate by reason of this subsection for the value of the retained interest,
extraordinary distributions, and changes in the capital structure of the enterprise after
the transfer described in paragraph (1).
(6) Treatment of certain grantor retained interest trusts-
(A) In general.-For purposes of this subsection, any retention of a qualified
trust income interest shall be disregarded and the property with respect to
which such interest exists shall be treated as held by the transferor while such
income interest continues.
(B) Qualified trust income interest-For purposes of subparagraph (A), the
term "qualified trust income interest" means any right to receive amounts
determined solely by reference to the income from property held in trust if-
(i) such right is for a period not exceeding 10 years,
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(ii) the person holding such right transferred the property to the trust, and
(iii) such person is not a trustee of such trust.
(7) Exceptions.-
(A) In general.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a transaction solely by reason
of I or more of the following:
(i) The receipt (or retention) of qualified debt.
(ii) Except as provided in regulations, the existence of an agreement for
the sale or lease of goods or other property to be used in the enterprise
or the providing of services and-
(I) the agreement is an ann s length agreement for fair market
value, and
(II) the agreement does not otherwise involve any change in
interests m the enterprise.
(iii) An optionor other agreement to buy or sell property at the fair
market value of such property as of the time the option is (or the rights
under the agreement are) exercised.
(B) Limitations.-
(i) Services performed after transfer.-In the case of compensation for
services performed after the transfer referred to in paragraph (lXB),
clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall not apply if such services were
performed under an agreement providing for the performance of services
over a period greater than 3 years after the date of the transfer. For
purposes of the preceding sentence, the term of any agreement includes
any period for which the agreement may be extended at the option of the
service provider.
(ii) Amounts rmust not be contingent on profits, etc.-Clause (ii) of
subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any amount determined (in whole or
in part) by reference to gross receipts, income, profits, or similar items
of the enterprise.
(C) Qualified debt-For purposes of this paragraph, except as provided in
subparagraph (D), the term "qualified debt" means any indebtedness if-
(i) such indebtedness-
(I) unconditionally reqires the payment of a sum certain in money
in 1 or more fixed payments on specified dates, and
(II) has a fixed maturity date not more than 15 years from the date
of issue (or, in the case of indebtedness secured by real property,
not more than 30 years from the date of issue).
(ii) the only other amount payable under such indebtedness is interest
determined at-
(1) a fixed rate, or
(H) a rate which bears a fixed relationship to a specified market
interest rate.
(iii) the interest payment dates are fixed,
(iv) such indebtedness is not by its terms subordinated to the claims of
general creditors,
(v) except in a case where such indebtedness is in default as to interest
or principal, such indebtedness does not grant voting rights to the person
to whom the debt is owed or place any limitation on the exercise of
voting rights by others, and
(vi) such indebtedness-
(I) is not (directly or indirectly) convertible into an interest in the
enterprise which would not be qualified debt, and
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The amendment first eliminated the requirement that the income
or rights retained by the transferor must constitute a disproportiona-
tely large share of the total income or rights in the enterprise.''
Furthermore, the amendment added a number of safe harbors for,
among other things, qualified debt, agreements for the sale or lease
of goods used in the enterprise, 3 certain consulting or services agree-
ments,'" and start-up debt.' Additionally, a provision was added
under which a gift from the transferor to the transferee is deemed to
(II) does not otherwise grant any right to acquire such an interest.
The requirement of clause (i)(1) that the principal be payable on 1 or
more specified dates and the requirement of clause (i)(II) shall not apply
to indebtedness payable on demand if such indebtedness is issued in
return for cash to be used to meet normal business needs of the
enterprise.
(D) Special rule for startup debt-
(i) In general.-For purposes of this paragraph, the term "qualified debt"
includes any qualified startup debt.
(ii) Qualified startup debt-For purposes of clause (i), the term "qualified
startup debt" means any indebtedness if-
(I) such indebtedness unconditionally requires the payment of a
sum certain in money,
(II) such indebtedness was received in exchange for cash to be used
in any enterpnse involving the active conduct of a trade or
business,
(I) the person to whom the indebtedness is owed has not at any
time (whether before, on, or after the exchange referred to in
subclause (11)) transferred any property (including goodwill) which
was not cash to the enterprise or transferred customers or other
business opportunities to the enterprise,
(IV) the person to whom the indebtedness is owed has not at any
time (whether before, on, or after the exchange referred to in
sublause (I)) held any interest in the enterprise (including an
interest as an officer, director, or employee) which was not
qualified start up debt,
(V) any person who (but for subparagraph (A)(i)) would have been
an original transferee (as defined in paragraph (4)(C)) participates
in the active management (as defined in section 2032A(e)(12)) of
the enterprise, and
(VI) such indebtedness meets the requirements of clauses (v) and
(vi) of subparagraph (C).
(8) Regulations.-The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary
or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this subsection, including such
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to prevent avoidance of the purposes
of this subsection through distributions or otherwise.
'o Id. See H.R. CoNF. RFP. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1988), repnnted m 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5048, 5133-34 [hereinafter CONFERC Ec REPORT].
102 I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C) (1989).
Id. § 2036(c)(7)(A), (B).
104 Id.
,' Id. § 2036(c)(7)(D).
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occur if the original transferor transfers his retained interest or if the
original transferee transfers the transferred property."s When focusing
upon this provision 7 however, it is important to note that terminations,
lapses and other changes m the interest in property are considered
transfers.
08
Other amendments to section 2036(c) included the addition of a right
of contribution for the tax generated by section 2036(c) from the person
receiving the section 2036(c) property, and for deemed gifts."9 A new
consideration adjustment that provides for an exclusion of a portion of the
enterprise was also enacted."'
These extensive amendments, however, did not resolve all of the
areas of statutory uncertainty; there remained many unknowns within the
statute. Major terms, such as "retained interest, .... disproportionate-
appreciation," "in effect transfer," and "enterprise," remained
undefined."' And since a bona fide sale to a family member did not
preclude inclusion in the transferor's gross estate,"' the consideration
offset provided in the statute was important."3 The determination of the
amount of consideration offset by the statute was complicated by the
tracing"4  rules found in the statute." 5  In addition to the tracing re-
quirements, numerous other complexities often arose."6 Perhaps the
most perplexing problem, however, was the determination of dispropor-
tionate appreciation. The House report had defined the term as the
relationship between two ratios:" 7
to Id. § 2036(cX4), (5).
Iri Id.
, Id. § 2036(c)(4)(DXiv).
Id. § 2036(cX4XA).
... Id. § 2036(c)(2). Perhaps because of the complexity of the amended statute, the Service was
given broad regulatory authority over the matters covered in tins section. See id. § 2036(c)(8);
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, at 75-77, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5135-37.
I See Monster, supra note 1, at 878.
I.R.C. § 2036(cX2) (1989).
11 Id.
Tracing involves the matching of proceeds with a specified expenditure. As to be expected in
light of attempts to trace loan proceeds to a specific expenditure, problems can arise as a result of
the fungibility of money. See Boits I. BnRr & MARTIN J. McMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 18-15 to 18-16 (1988).
" ILR.C. § 2036(cX2) (1989).
.. To farther complicate one's analysis under this statutory framework, it was often unclear
whether adjustments for interest and appreciation on the consideration from the date of receipt until
the transferor's death could be allowed in some situations. Also, the "deemed gift" rule, added by the
1988 amendments, would cause significant problems if given a broad interpretation. See Monster,
supra note 1, at 879-81.
"' H.t. REP. No. 795, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 423 n.20.
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Potential Appreciation of Transferred Property
Value of the Transferred Property
and
Potential Appreciation of Retained Interest
Value of Retained Interest
If the first ratio was larger than the second, the test was satisfied.
However, the test required a problematic prediction of the amount of
appreciation that would occur m the future."'
Perhaps the most significant problem of the amended statute,
however, was that the effect of section 2036(c) on traditional estate
planning tools, such as the credit shelter trust 9 and the irrevocable life
insurance trust, 2 as well as newer tools, such as the Grantor Retained
Income Trust ("GRIT"), was uncertain.m  And the broad regulatory
authority given the Service" 3 gives rise to thoughts that Congress knew
it had created a monster beyond its control.
Under its broad regulatory authority, the Service attempted to provide
guidance to practitioners. In advance of regulations, the Service issued an
"administrative pronouncement" complete with footnotes and forty-si
examples on the workings of section 2036(c).24 Even the Service
recognized the statute's problems:
Section 2036(c) applies if a person who holds a substantial interest in
an enterprise (the "transferor") in effect transfers property having a
"' See Monster, supra note 1, at 883. Tins was not the only problem of the statute. The second
ratio is not found in the statute. Furthermore, the test required difficult valuations of the retained
interests and the transferred property. Iromcally, the difficulty of deterrmmng these values helped to
engender the enactment of I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1989). Id. at 882, 884.
"' A "credit shelter true" is a trust funded with assets having a value equal to the transferor's or
testator's unused unified credit with provisions ensuring that it will not be taxed at the death of
transferor's or testator's spouse. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & CAROL ANN MOONEY, Tim PLANNING
AND DRAFrING OF WILLs AND TRusrs 150-53 (3d ed. 1991); I.R.C. §§ 2010(a), 2505(a).
"' An "irrevocable life insurance trust" is a trust designed to be excluded from the grantor's gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes under I.R.C. § 2042. In order to meet the reqmrements of Treas.
Reg. § 20.2042-I(c)(2) (1992), the trust is characterized by agreements designed to insure that "the
insured will have no power to change the beneficiary, surrender or cancel the policy [or retain any
other element of control]." GEORGE M. TuRmNt, IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS § 15.13, at 15-11 (2d ed.
1992).
' This Article will not treat the GRIT in any detail because Chapter 14 treats the GRIT
separately from estate freezes. Part II of tins Article, wich will focus on section 2702, will discuss
the current treatment of GRiTs.
' Monster, supra note 1, at 888-93; Gazur, supra note 1, at 143-52.
2 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
I.R.S. Notice 89-99, 1989-2 C.B. 422.
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disproportionately large share of the potential appreciation in such
interest, while retaining an interest in the income of, or rights in, the
enterprise. The italicized terms embody the significant features and
operative elements, and thus delineate the scope, of the statute.
Unfortunately, they are neither adequately defined in the statute nor
susceptible to generally accepted interpretation. "
In the I.LRS. Notice, the Service attempted to interpret Congressional
intent.' 26 Based on its examination of Congressional intent, the Service
stated its view that section 2036(c) was not limited to corporate and
partnership freeze techniques, "but also [applied] to other arrangements
that circumvent the transfer tax system."' 27  More specifically, the
Service stated that "other arrangements may include""l2s the following:
(1) GRITs and other trusts where the grantor retains a beneficial
interest;
(2) Private annuities, installment sales, sales of remainder interests
and other intrafamily sales;
(3) Sale-leasebacks and gift-leasebacks; and
(4) Joint purchases. 29
Thus, the focus of the Service became tax avoidance. Transactions clearly
within the language of the section could nonetheless be exempted if the
Service determined that such transactions did not present the potential for
tax avoidance."
I.R.S. Notice 89-99 was welcomed as valuable guidance to attorneys
attempting to interpret the vague statute.' 3' For example, the exemptions
for "enterprises" involving life insurance, the principal residence of an
individual, and exclusively personal use property, provided clear-cut
answers that were absent from the statute.32
12 Id. at 422.
" Id. at 423. Basically, the Service believed Congress was focusing on circumvention of the
transfer tax system through undervaluation, the failure to exercise rights or powers contrary to the
assumptions on which the interests were onginally valued, and the coupling of the transfer of
appreciation with the retention of income or other rights enabling the transferor to exclude the
appreciation while still enjoying the property.
17 Id.
22 Id.
212 Id.
"3 Id. The example given was arrangements involving exclusively personal use property.
1.2 See King, supm note 1, at 27.
,22 I.R.S. Notice 89-99, 1989-2 C.B. 422, 424. For example, the Service provided gtudance
concerning transactions that would not be considered to be the transfer of a disproportionately large
share of potential appreciation and general powers of appointment over the corpus in a GRIT. Id. at
428-31. In addition, strct rules governing buy-sell agreements and consideration were provided. Id.
at 433-34.
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Yet many things remained unclear. "Enterprise" and "disproportionate
appreciation" remained undefined. Commentators were convinced that
because of its vagueness, section 2036(c)"' extended beyond its target
and seriously threatened all family businesses." The statute could be
applied much too broadly,'35 and the safe harbors often were both
arbitrary and ambiguous. 3' The critics, especially the business commu-
nity and its representatives, did not go away.
IV CHAPTER 14: IS JASON WORSE TiAN FREDDY 9
A. The Problems of Section 2036(c)
Even as interpreted by I.R.S. Notice 89-99,' section 2036(c)"as
was subject to many criticisms. Some of the most telling were:(1) As detailed to some extent above, section 2036(c) failed to define
and limit its key concepts and definitions.'39 Among such terms were
"enterprise," "disproportionate appreciation," "retained interest" and "in
effect transfer."'
40
(2) Partly because of the definitional problems, the scope of section
2036(c) was unclear. Therefore, the statute was extended well beyond its
stated target-certain corporate recapitalizations-and became potentially
applicable to almost every corporate transaction in a family held business.
In a word, the statute was overmclusive.1
41
(3) Section 2036(c) unfairly discriminated against family business-
es. For example, adverse estate tax consequences could arise from an
1.R.C. § 2036(c) (1989).
"4See Slaying, supra note I, at 152.
1'Id.
"'Id.
"' I.RS. Notice 89-99, 1989-2 C.B. 422.
I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1989).
"' See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 111-22; Slaying, supra note I, at 152.
... Slaying, supra note 1, at 152; S. Stacy Eastland, The Legacy of .R.C. Section 2036(c): Saving
the Closely Held Business After Congress Made "Tnterpnse" a Dirty Word, 24 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR J., 259, 328 (1989) [hereinafter Legacy]; see generally Chairman Rostenkawsli's discussion
draft of a bill to modify section 2036(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended relating
to estate valuation freezes: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990) [herinafter Hearings].
"' Senate Explanatory Material Concerning Committee on Finance 1990 Reconciliation
Submission Pursuant to HR. Con. Res. 310, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. Rac. S15,629, 15,680
(daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990) [hereinafter Senate Report]. Due to the short deadline, the Senate Budget
Committee sent the reconciliation bill to the floor without prnting a formal report. The reports
submitted by the various senate committees (including the Finance Committee) were submitted in lieu
of a formal report at the beginning of the debate. Pages are cited to the Finance Committee
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arm's length transaction if the parties involved were related.'" Signifi-
cantly, however, I.R.C. 2036(c) never applied to publicly traded business-
es.1"
(4) Section 2036(c) was also undernclusive in that it neither
eliminated estate freezes nor solved the valuation problems that caused
Congress to legislate against freezes.
45
(5) As applied to certain transactions where there is no gift in a tax
sense, section 2036(c) was at least potentially unconstitutional. 146
Many commentators and policy advocates argued that even under the
most abusive estate freezes, the estate tax inclusion approach of section
2036(c) 47 was the wrong way to solve the problem. 4S These policy
advocates based their position on an argument that the problem of estate
freezes was not one of inclusion or exclusion, but one of the valuation
of the various interests created by the estate freeze. 149 The most com-
mon of the valuation problems involved placing a value on preferred and
common stock interests.'50
The abuses involved allocating a disproportionately high value to the
preferred stock, resulting in an undervaluation of the common stock.'
Moreover, as the abuses occur not at death, but at the time of the split in
the ownership of the preferred and common interests, the problem of
freezes is in reality a gift tax valuation problem, not an estate tax
inclusion problem. If viewed from this more narrow approach that the
Explanations and to the Congressional Record. See also Legacy, supra note 141, at 325 (discussing
preferred interests in closely held businesses); S/aymg, supra note 1, at 152.
' Slaying, supra note 1, at 152.
" Legacy, supra note 141, at 325.
,5Id. at 326-27 (stating that LR.C. § 2036(c) did not resolve the problem of valuing transferred
growth interests).
'" Stacy Eastland was the leading proponent of this theory. Id. at 328-30. This theory is based
upon an argument that I.RLC. § 2036(c) may violate Article 1, Section 9 of the United States
Constitution as an unapportioned direct tax on property. Since § 2036(c) does not require a gift
element for transferred property, it may be applied to an econormc bargain and thus constitute a
direct tax on property. Itis also potentially a denial of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
Id. at 328-29. Eastland, an attorney practicing with Baker & Botts in Houston, Texas, chaired the
ABA's Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Committee C-6 on Estate Planning and
Drafting: Partnerships. Id. at 259.
I.RtC. § 2036(c) (1989).
'"Id. at 326-27; Hearings, supra note 141, at 1-4 (statement of E. James Gamble at 1; statement
of John A. Wallace at 2-3; statement of Jere D. McGaffey at 2-3); Senate Report, supra note 142,
at S15,680.
'See e-g., Hearings, supra note 141 (statement of E. James Gamble at 1).
" See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
... See Cooper, supra note 1, at 225-26.
... Hearings, supra note 141 (statement of Jere D. McGaffey at 1-2); Slaying, supra note 1, at
153; see also Legacy, supra note 141, at 324-25 (discussing the advantages of preferred ownership
interests); Senate Report, supra note 142, at 58.
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abuses are actually problems of gift tax valuation, a solution can be
constructed that "allows legitimate preferred stock recaps and their
partnership equivalents."'' Under such an approach, fair valuation
of such interests created by the estate freeze would be required,
legitimate recapitalizations would be allowed, and only abusive
freezes would be attacked.
B. The Development of a Replacement
As mentioned in the preceding section, section 2036(c)" was
subject to severe criticism. The problem came to a head in the Spring
of 1990. Representative Daniel Rostenkowski, Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee, introduced a Discussion Draft5 of a
new statute that would repeal section 2036(c) and substitute a gift tax
valuation approach.56 A hearing on the Discussion Draft took place
on April 24, 1990.2"7 On June 27, 1990, the Senate Finance Commi-
ttee and two subcommittees held a joint hearing on the Discussion
Draft, '5 and on August 1, 1990, Chairman Rostenkowski introduced
H.R. 5425, which served to modify and elaborate upon the format
presented in the Discussion Draft.'59
The Senate soon followed the House's initiative. On September
26, 1990, Senators Bentsen, Boren and Daschale introduced S. 3113,
which repealed section 2036(c) and substituted a different method of
regulating estate freezes."' ° On October 13, 1990, S. 3113 was
modified to track many of the key provisions of H.R. 5425.161 The
Senate Bill, introduced on October 13, became sections 11,601 and
11,602 of the Revenue Reconciliation Act, which became part of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("OBRA") of 1990, enacted on
November 5, 1990."
". Hearings, supra note 141, at 1-2.
I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1989).
"'See supra note 141.
S' . STACY EASTLAND, Estate Planning for the Family Pannership under Section 2701 and the
Proposed Regulations, on A.L.I.-A.B.A. VIDEO L. REv., ESTATE PLANNING UNDER NEw CHAPTER
14 AND THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS 93 (June 13, 1991) (citation to transcnpt on file) [hereinafter
Eastland Outline].
157 Id.
15 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
"' Id.
' Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 491 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2701 to 2704 (1990)).
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C. Summary of Chapter 14
Section 2036(c) was repealed retroactively163 and was replaced with
four new sections. Section 2701, with which thins Article is concerned,
covers estate freezes." Section 2702 deals with valuations of interests
in trusts and analogous situations.'65 Section 2703 covers buy-sell agree-
ments and other restrictions on transfers.'" Section 2704 involves
interests with voting rights which lapse. 67
Since the discussion of section 2701 m the remainder of this Article
is organized by suggestions as to the conditions under which a recapital-
ization is and is not appropriate, a brief overview of section 2701 will be
provided. This is necessary as the main crux of this Article involves the
appropriate use of preferred and common interests m a restructuring,
rather than a technical explanation of the statute's provisions.
In the words of the statute, section 2701 is applicable "[s]olely for
purposes of determining whether a transfer of an interest m a corporation
or partnership to a member of the transferor's family is a gift,"'"
and, if so, the value of the gift.'69 Under the provisions of the statute,
if a transferor transfers common stock,' 7' but retains preferred stock m
an entity,17' any liquidation, put,'" call, 73 or conversion right'74
of the preferred stock (hereinafter referred to as "extraordinary payment
U Id. § 11,601(a), (c).
'" I.R.C. § 2701 (1992).
" Id. § 2702. This will form the subject of part II of this Article.
'"Id. § 2703. This will not be covered in this Article.
Ul Id. § 2704. This will not be covered in tns Article.
Id. § 2701(aX1) (emphasis added). Although the section is not by its terms applicable to the
estate tax, the section does have estate tax ramifications. Its application to the generation-skapping
tax is uncertain.
'"Id.
Technically, a junior equity interest, defined in I.R.C. § 2701(a)(4)(B)(i) (1992) as common
stock, if in a corporation, or if the interest is in a partnership, the interest in which the income and
capital rights are junior to all other equity classes.
" Technically, applicable retained interest, defined in I.R.C. § 2701(b) (1992) as an interest that
contains a liquidation, put, call, or conversion nght, or a distribution right if the transferor and
applicable family members control the entity immediately before the transaction. Control requires the
holding of at least 50% by value or vote. In partnerships, it requires 50% of the capital or profits
interest or being a general partner in a limited partnership. I.R.C. § 2701(b)(2) (1992). Applicable
family members are the transferor's spouse, ancestors of the transferor and her spouse, and spouses
of ancestors. I.R.C. § 2701(eX2) (1992).
"n A "put" s an option to sell a security as specified in an agreement, during a specified period
at a fixed price. See H.AmITON, supra note 12, at 474.
" A "call" is an option to purchase a security as specified m an agreement, during a specified
period at a fixed price. Id. at 540.
" A conversion right entitles the holder of the preferred stock to convert the stock into a fixed
number of common shares in the same enterprise. Id. at 548.
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rights") is deemed to have a value of zero.175 If the corporation is
a controlled entity,'76 any distribution right177 except a qualified
payment right178 is valued at zero.'79 Qualified payment rights are
basically cumulative dividend rights payable on a periodic basis at a
fixed rate 8' and are valued at fair market value.'8'
Since the value of the gift is determined by the subtraction meth-
od," in most cases a lower value of the preferred stock will cause
a higher taxable gift and a higher gift tax. This is because in most
estate freezes involving recapitalizations, the common stock is given
away and the preferred retained.' 3
If the preferred interest contains a qualified payment right and the
dividends are not paid within four years of the due date,"s the
transferor's taxable estate or taxable gifts are increased by the amount
of the unpaid dividends plus hypothetical earnings"5 on the divi-
dends. 8 The earnings are determined by assuming that the divi-
dends were paid on the due date and reinvested on that date at a yield
equal to the discount rate used in determining the value of the
applicable retained interest at the time of the transfer. 7 This
' I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(A) (1992). There are limited exceptions to this valuation provision. For
example, fixed rights, exercisable at a fixed time and amount, are excluded from the definition. Id.
§ 2701(b)(2)(B). Similarly excluded are rights to convert into a fixed number of shares in the same
class as the transferred shares /f.the sight does not lapse, can be adjusted for splits and similar
changes, and must be adjusted for accumulated but unpaid dividends. Id. § 2701(c)(2)(C).
'7, Id. § 2701(b)(2); see supra note 171.
m A distribution right is-a right to receive distributions on stock or an interest in the partnership.
I.R.C. § 2701(c)(1)(A) (1992). Again, there are exceptions to the general rule laid down by the
statute. Distribution rights in junior equity interests, extraordinary payment rights, and I.RC. §
707(c) guaranteed payments are excluded. Id. § 2701(c)(1)(B).
" Qualified payment rights include dividends on cumulative preferred stock, and similar
partnership interests, payable periodically at a fixed rate. Id. § 2701(c)(3)(A). The cumulative
preferred stock exemption is logical because unpaid dividends must be paid before the common
shareholders receive any dividends. See HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 549.
I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(A) (1992).
' See supra note 178.
.. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(a)(4) (1992).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b) (1992). The subtraction method is the method used to detemune
the amount of a gift resulting from an I.SC. § 2701 transfer. The value of family-held senior equity
interests (i.e., preferred stock) is subtracted from the fair market value, before the transfer, of family-
held interest in the entity. The resulting amount is allocated among the transferred interests and other
subordinate family-held equity interests. The regulations provide a step-by-step method for
deterimng the final allocation. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b) (1992).
See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 2701(d)(2)(c) (1992).
10 See infra note 187 and accompanying text
I.R.C. § 2701(d)(1), (2)(A) (1992).
7 Id. § 2701(d)(2)(A)(i). See mfra note 205.
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increase is limited, however, to the increase m value of interests
jumor"as to the preferred stock.' "
While section 2701 is broad m its general scope, it is limited by a
number of specific provisions within the statutory framework. For
example, the following are not subject to section 2701.
(1) Preferred stock and common stock for which market quotations
on an established securities market are available; 0
(2) The retained interest if it is of the same class as the transferred
interest;..9
(3) The retained interest where it is proportionately the same as the
transferred interest, ignoring nonlapsmg differences in voting power;
and
(4) Transfers that result in a proportionate reduction of each class of
stock held by the transferor.93
With tis in mind, there are a number of rules to use when developing an
estate freeze.
V RULE 1-USE CUMULATIVE PREFERRED STOCK OR
SIMILAR PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
Prior to a discussion of the first rule of estate freezing under Chapter
14, it is necessary to focus briefly upon the portions of section 2701 this
Article will discuss. The classic -recapitalization or partnership freeze is
rarely done with marketable securities or with one class of securities with
differences in voting nghts."9 It is possible that in the future one might
see a partial freeze based on a proportionate reduction in each class of
stock held by the older generation member. For example, a closely held
corporation with only common stock could recapitalize and issue common
and preferred. The grantor-owner could then transfer, for example, one-
half of the common and one-half of the preferred to the younger
generation. Section 2701 would not apply to this transfer."5 Such
transactions would insulate the transferor from estate inclusion of the
Jumor equity interest is defined in I.R.C. § 2701(a)(4)(B)(i). See supra note 170.
I.R.C. § 2701(dX2)(B) (1992). If the transferor did not own the entire class of preferred, the
limit is adjusted for his ownership percentage. Id.
1' Id. § 2701(aXl), (2XA).
' Id. § 2701(aX2)(B).
" Id. § 2701(aX2XC).
,. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-I(cX4) (1992).
"' Although it is possible that an S corporation could do a partial freeze of the latter type, the
freeze would not be truly effective because of the appreciation potential of the retained stock.
" 'I.R.C. § 2701(a)(2XC) (1992); Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-1(cX4) (1992).
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appreciation on the common transferred from the date of transfer until
death.
Whether such transactions will become more common m the future
may depend on many factors, including significant non-tax factors such
as the age and health of the owner, his desire to cut down on the time
spent in the business, and the ability and desire of the younger generation
to run the company.
Other than the proportionality exemption, 9' in most normal cases
in which a recapitalization will be considered it can be assumed that the
section 2701 exemptions will not apply and thus the transaction will fall
within the scope of section 2701. Moreover, in most cases the corporation
involved will be a controlled entity where the transferor and the
applicable family members have at least fifty percent ownership, either
by value or by vote, immediately before the transaction.'97 Therefore,
all distribution rights other than qualified payment rights are valued at
zero.
98
The first rule for estate freezing inthe 1990s is simple: the preferred
stock must be cumulative. The reason is that cumulative preferred stock
is the only stock that contains a qualified payment right'99 and is thus
' I.R.C. § 2701(a)(2)(C) (1992).
Id. § 2701(b).Id. § 2701(a)(3)(A). Nonetheless, if the corporation is not a controlled entity, any distribution
right will be valued at fair market value. Thus, noncumulative dividends will become available to
increase the value of the preferred and limit the gift tax on the transfer. As discussed earlier, one of
the abuses believed to be present in estate freezes of the 1970s and early 1980s was the creation of
igh-rate noncumulative dividends with no expectation of payment. See supra notes 28-31 and
accompanying text. Tis, theoretically, could still happen if the corporation is not a controlled entity.
However, the Service has begun to attack the non-payment of such noncumulative dividends as gifts.
See Pnv. Ltr. Rul. 87-230-07 (Feb. 18, 1987). Similarly, the Service may police situations in which
holders of convertible preferred stock refrain from converting their securities when such a conversion
would be financially beneficial to the holder of the preferred interest. See Pnv. Itr. Rul. 87-26-005
(Mar. 13, 1987) (failure to exercise conversion rights was gift from preferred to common
shareholders).
I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3) (1992). To get to this result takes several steps. First, the statute applies
to applicable retained interests. Id. § 2701(a)(1)(B). Applicable retained interests include distribution
rights in controlled entities, id. § 2701(b)(1)(A), and liquidation, put, call and conversion rights. Id.
§ 2701(b)(1)(B). These rights are valued under § 2701(a)(3). Liquidation, put, call and conversion
rights and distribution rights other than qualified payment rights are valued at zero per operation of
§ 2701(a)(3). Furthemore, distribution rights include any right to distributions from stock or
partnership interests except junior equity interests and § 707(c) guaranteed payments. Id. §
2701(c)(1). Finally, qualified payment rights, rights that are not valued at zero by § 2701(a)(3), are
rights to periodic, fixed-rate dividends on "cumulative preferred stock (or a comparable payment
under any partnership interest) "Id. § 2701(c)(3)(A). As a result of the interworlongs of these
sections, it becomes obvious that one must use cumulative preferred stock to avoid a valuation of
zero under section 2701(a)(3) because of the necessity of maintaining a qualified payment right under
section 2701(c)(3)(A).
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the only stock that is valued at fair market value."s° Therefore, if the
client's desire is to pay a low gift tax, or to avoid the payment of any gift
tax, the value of the preferred must be equal to a large portion of the
value of the corporation. The only way to meet this objective is through
the use of cumulative preferred stock.20'
VI. RULE 2-ALWAYs PAY THE CUMULATIVE DIVIDEND
WITHIN FOUR YEARS OF THE PAYMENT DATE
Suppose a client does not need the cumulative dividend or wishes to
avoid increasing the size of hIs estate and requests that the dividend be
used by the corporation to expand its business. Any such attempt, of
course, could trigger an argument by the IRS that such an act would
amount to a gift to the common shareholders.2 2 The Service, however,
has another option, an option that is drastic for the client. Section 2701
provides that failure to pay a cumulative dividend results m an increase
in the transferor's taxable estate or taxable gifts.03 As a result, the
transferor's estate or gifts would be increased by the amount of dividends
not paid within four years of the due date of the dividend." This
amount is further increased as the amount of dividends not paid is
compounded by the "discount rate used in determining the value of the
applicable retained interest"2 5 at the time of the original transfer, less
Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(a)(4) (1992).
' It should be noted that the rate of the cumulative preferred can be either fixed or tied to a
specific market interest rate (for example, prime rate less 4%). I.R.C. § 2701(c)(3)(A), (B) (1992).
The regulations require the dividend to be payable annually and permit a dividend of a fixed amount.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(bX6) (1992).
See Pnv. Ltr. Ruls. 87-260-05 (Mar. 13, 1987), 87-230-07 (Feb. 18, 1987).
I.R.C. § 2701(d)(I) (1992). The increase is to taxable gifts if the retained interest is transferred
or if the payment is made more than four years after the due date. The increase is to the taxable
estate on death of the transferor if the applicable retained interest is included in his or her estate. Id.
§ 2701(dX3). Special rules are prescribed for transfers to spouses and applicable family members.
Id. § 2701(dX3)-(4).
- Id. § 2701(d)(2XC).
.. Id. § 2701(d)(2). The term "discount rate" is ambiguous. It has been suggested that the rate
be the one used in valuing the corporation. See Carlyn McCaffrey & Susan P. Witkin, Asset Freezes
and New Valuation Rules of Chapter 14, 25 U. MIAMi INST. ON ESr. PLAN. % 900, 901.4, at 9-16
(1991). Several other choices, such as the applicable federal rate under § 1274, or the § 7872 and §
7520 rates, are possibilities. Id. Perhaps a choice more in keeping with the purpose of § 2701 would
be the cumulative dividend rate set in the original transaction or elected by the transferor if the
transferor took advantage of the provisions of I.R.C. § 2701(c)(4)(C)(ii) to treat otherwise non-
qualifing distribution rights as qualified payments. If a payment on a cumulative preferred dividend
is not made, it must be assumed that the amount of the dividend is reinvested in the corporation. It
must also be assumed that the transferor who is the holder of the applicable retained interest cannot
expect to earn more on the funds invested in the corporation than the rate of the cumulative dividend.
Therefore, the choice of the cumulative dividend rate is logical in this context, and would be
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the value of any dividends actually paid similarly compounded." For
the purposes of compounding, the dividends are treated as if they were
paid on the due date. It is also important to note that the termination of
the interest,"7 or of the individual's rights,"' is a taxable event.2
The increase resulting from compounding is limited, however, to the
percentage of the class owned by the transferor multiplied by the increase
in the value of junior equity interests after the transfer.10
In the prototype estate freeze where the transferor has retained all of
the preferred and transfers all the common to the younger generation, the
limit is the appreciation in the common.2" Lest one think that the
consistent with the valuation of such funds under modem valuation techniques such as the Capital
Asset Pricing Model. See BPjI-HiM, supra note 45, at 602. This is consistent, in theory, with what
a corporation would be required to pay as a cost of retained earnings to a reasonable investor. Id. at
602-03. It is to be regretted that the statute is not more specific on the rate to be used. Nor do the
regulations provide much aid. For example, Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-4(c)(3) (1992) provides: "The
appropriate discount rate is the discount rate that was applied in determing the value of the
qualified payment right at the time of the transfer to wich section 2701 applied."
I.R.C. § 2701(d)(2) (1992); see supra note 205.
I.R.C. § 2701(d)(5) (1992).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-4(b)(1) (1992).
The taxable transfer may be postponed if at the time of the termination of the individual's
nghts to a qualified payment, the property would be included in his or her gross estate if the
individual died immediately after the termination. In such a case, the increase in gifts is postponed
until the earlier of the individual's death or the time the property would not be includable in the
individual's gross estate (except under section 2035). Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-4(b)(2) (1992). The
statute contains attribution rules, which can also cause taxable events. See id. § 25.2701-4(b)(1). See
I.R.C. § 2701(eX3) (1992) and Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-6 (1992) for the attribution rules.
0 I.RC. § 2701(d)(2)(B) (1992).
... Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-4(c)(6) (1992) states this limitation as follows:
(i) In general. The amount of the increase to an individual's taxable estate or taxable gifts
is limited to the applicable percentage of the excess, if any, of-
(A) The sum of-
(1) The fair market value of all outstanding equity interests in the entity that
are subordinate to the applicable retained interest, determined as of the date of
the taxable event without regard to any accrued liability attributable to unpaid
qualified payments; and
(2) Any amounts expended by the entity to redeem or otherwise acquire any
such subordinate interest during the period beginning on the date of the
transfer to which section 2701 applied (or, in the case of an individual treated
as an interest holder, on the date the interest of the prior interest holder
terminated) and ending on the date of the taxable event (reduced by any
amounts received on the resale or issuance of any such subordinate interest
during the same period); over
(B) The fair market value of all outstanding equity interests in the entity that are
subordinate to the applicable retained interest, deternned as of the date of the
transfer to which section 2701 applied (or, in the case of an individual treated as an
interest holder, on the date the interest of the prior interest holder terminated).
(ii) Computation of limitation. For purposes of computing the limitation applicable under
this paragraph (c)(6), the aggregate fair market value of the subordinate interests in the
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penalty is not substantial, Professor Stacy Eastland has estimated the
increase on the following set of facts:
P owns 80% of the partnership interests of Freeze, Ltd. (all of Freeze
Ltd.'s assets are worth $2,250,000). For years her attorney has been
telling her that she should consider malng some significant gifts of her
partnership interests in Freeze, Ltd. to her two children, Cl and C2.
From time to time, P did make some small gifts and collectively Cl and
C2 own 20% of the limited partnership interests of Freeze, Ltd. P has
been reluctant to make any more gifts because (i) she wants control of
the partnership (it is her life); (ii) she is afraid that making significant
gifts of her enterprise to her children would result in cash distributions
to her children, which would spoil them; and (iii) she wishes to retain
the option of receiving cash flow from her business in case she has
deteriorating health. However, P recognizes that her business will
probably grow substantially in the future and as a result under our estate
tax laws the government will be a senior partner in her business, all of
which distresses her. In 1991, her attorney suggested that she do a
reorganization that results in her receiving a frozen limited partnership
interest and not elect to treat that frozen distribution right as a qualified
payment. More specifically, her attorney suggests: P and her children
enter into the following reorganization of the partnership. In 1991 P will
receive 8% non-cumulative preferred partnership interest with a par
value of $1.8 million. P will have the discretionary right to put that
preferred partnership interest into the partnership at any time for
$1,000,000. Upon liquidation of the partnership the preferred partnership
interest will be entitled to $1.8 million but would not be entitled to any
other part of the growth of the partnership. P will be the managing
partner. P will have the first right to purchase any additional preferred
partnership interest or growth partnership interest that is issued by the
partnership. The partnership is to terminate in 2041. Under normal
valuation principles under IRC § 2512, P would have been charged with
entity are determined without regard to § 25.2701-3(c).
(iii) Applicable percentage. The applicable percentage is deterrmned by dividing the
number of shares orunits of the applicable retained interest held by the interest holder (or
an individual treated as the interest holder) on the date of the taxable event by the total
number of such shares or units outstanding on the same date. If an individual holds
applicable retained interests in two or more classes of interests, the applicable percentage
is equal to the largest applicable percentage determined with respect to any class. For
example, if T retains 40 percent of the class A preferred and 60 percent of the class B
preferred in a corporation, the applicable percentage with respect to T's holdings is 60
percent.
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making a $100,000 gift by participating in the reorganization. In other
words, P's preferred interest is worth $1,700,000. Cl's interest and C2's
interest is worth 40% less than its liquidation value before the freeze,
or $270,000. In the year 2021, at the time of P's death the partnership
is worth $6,000,000. From 1991 to 2021, the partnership only had the
wherewithal to distribute $72,000 a year to P, pursuant to her non-
cumulative distribution nghts."2
Assuming that P elected to have her noncumulative preferred
partnership interest treated as a qualified payment interest, the maximum
upward adjustment equals $144,000 multiplied by the assumed discount
rate for fifteen years."3 Assuming a ten percent discount rate, the
maximum adjustment is $5,032,76 1.124 However, since the appreciation
m the growth interest is only $4,000,000, the adjustment is lirmted to
$4,000,000 215 because of the operation of Treasury Regulation section
25.2701-4(c)(6). 216 Notice that this analysis presumes that one-half of
the payments due are made. The adjustment, absent the $4,000,000
limiting factor,21 7 would be much greater if the payments to P had been
less or nonexistent. Another commentator has computed that the increase
on $1,000,000 of ten percent cumulative preferred stock if dividends are
not paid for ten years results m an increase to the taxable base of
$2,599,000.2s To avoid such increases it is vital that dividends be paid
when due, or at least within four years of the due date.21 9
VII. RULE 3-DON'T BE GREEDY.
SET THE DIVIDEND AT A RATE THE CORPORATION
OR PARTNERSHIP CAN AFFORD
This rule is really a combination of the last two rules. The preferred
must be cumulative to accomplish the freeze 02° But setting the dividend
"' Eastland Outline, supra note 156, at 120-21.
... Id. at 128.
21 Id. at 129.
212 For a more detailed account of this analysis, see id.
2 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
217 Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-4(c)(6) (1992); see supra note 211 and accompanying text.
2 JEa D. McGAFF-Y, Corporate Freezes and Section 2701, on A.L.I.-A.B.A. VIDEO L. REv.,
ESrATE PLANNING UNDER New CHtAI'Te 14 AND THE PRoPosED REGULATIONS 63, 77 (June 13,
1991) (citation to transcnpt on file) (noting the tremendous impact that the compounding of payments
has upon ultimate value, and therefore, the taxable base of the taxpayer).
21' The value of the transferor's estate or gifts for tax purposes is only increased by the amount
of unpaid dividends past due by more than four years by operation of I.R.C. § 2701(d)(2)(C) (1992).
For a discussion of this point, see supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
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rate too high could result in large increases m later years' taxable gifts or
m the decedent's taxable estateY' It is highly unlikely that these later
increases will be anticipated by the client or his family, who typically
will wish to avoid estate or current gift taxation. Such increases could
destroy the effectiveness of the estate plan. Therefore, the dividend should
be set at a rate that can be easily covered by the corporation's or
partnership's anticipated cash flow. Possible developments and downturns
m the business should be taken into account and the rate set should be
reasonable and well within the capacity of the corporation to pay.'
As demonstrated in the last section, the dracoman penalty for unpaid
distributions provides great incentives for payment of the cumulative
dividends on time.' Similarly, it mandates caution when setting the
dividend rate and it militates against "electing BL"' Prior to moving
on, however, a brief pause is required to discuss what appears to be a
significant omission in the statute.
In order to avoid increases in the transferor's taxable estate or taxable
gifts, the dividends must be paid' In planning her estate, a business
owner can probably anticipate with a fair degree of accuracy the cash
flow of her business for at least several years. 6 This information, of
course, is crucial in designing the preferred stock and setting the
dividend, because the dividend must be set at a rate that the corporation
"2 This situation would result if the rate was set so high that the corporation could not meet the
payments to the point that dividends older than four years were in arrears. Such a situation would
trigger compounding under I.R.C. § 2701(dX2) (1992). For a discussion of the workings of this
statute, and closely related statues, see supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
' The result of such a strategy, of course, is that the transferor will make a greater gift at the
time of the recapitalization than was the case prior to 1990. For example, suppose A owns all the
stock in a $5,000,000 corporation. He recapitalizes the corporation into preferred and common,
retaining the preferred and giving the common to Ins children. Assume a cumulative dividend rate
on the preferred of 10% would support a preferred value of $4,400,000. However, after evaluating
his cash flow and future expectations, A decides the corporation can afford to pay only a five percent
rate. Assume that the five percent cumulative dividend supports a preferred value of $3,000,000. A
has not previously used his unified credit. With a 10% cumulative dividend, P would have made a
S600,000 gift (ignoring annual exclusions) and paid no gift tax. With a five percent dividend he
makes a gift of $2,000,000 (ignoring annual exclusions) and pays a gift tax of $780,800. However,
assuming the dividends are paid when due, there will be no increase in his gross estate or future
taxable gifts.
See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
Section 2701(cX4XCXii) provides that the transferor may elect to treat otherwise non-
qualifying distribution nghts as qualified payments. See supra note 205.
See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
Of course if the company is about to embark on a risky new venture, or market conditions
are expected to change radically, a reasonably accurate forecast of cash flows will be considerably
more difficult. In the case of a stable company within a mature industry, however, projections of cash
flows to the degree of accuracy necessary can often be achieved through an effective use of financial
planners. See Bwmu Am, supra note 45, at 378-79.
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can afford to pay regularly. However, section 2701 has no provision for
the interruption of a dividend due to an unanticipated event. For example,
suppose the business suffers a large adverse court judgment that will
prohibit the payment of dividends for several years. Or, perhaps more
likely, suppose the company incurs clean-up liability under CERCLA.27
In such a case, the client would be hit with increased estate or gift tax
liability." It is unlikely that the drafters of section 2701 contemplated
this scenano.'
The statute does, however, contain two provisions that may mitigate
this type of problem. First, the statute provides that distributions paid
within four years of the due date are treated as having been made on the
due date." Therefore, such payments made during this four-year
window will prevent the imposition of any additional estate or gift tax.
Thus, if the impact of the adverse event is of moderate degree, the
possibility exists that the business can recover enough to pay the
dividends within four years of the due date. Second, the limitation on the
increase to the increased value of junior equity interests "i can be of
assistance. A catastrophic business reversal, such as bankruptcy or
CERCLA liability, would clearly reduce the value of the common stock,
and could in fact cause the value of the common stock to be worth less
than when the transfer was made. In such case, of course, no addition to
the client's later gifts or taxable estate would occur3 2 The problem with
these two mechanisms is that they are useful only for limited periods.
They would not provide relief in all cases.
For example, assume that the client recapitalizes the stock of his
family-owned business into seven percent cumulative preferred and
common stock. He retains the preferred and gives the common to his
children. For the first four years the preferred dividends are paid, but m
27 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1988). For a discussion of the application of CERCLA in this context, see Lewis M.
Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus. LAw. 923 (1990) (providing an analysis
of existing CERCLA case law); Andrew J. Simons & James J. Wicks, Natural Resources Damages
Under CERCLA: Here They Come, Ready or Not, 63 ST. JoHN's L. Rsv. 801 (1989) (addressing the
vagueness of many of the provisions of CERCLA).
This liability would result by operation of I.R.C. § 2701(d)(2)(C). For a discussion of this
provision, see supra notes 202-18 and accompanying text.
Clearly such an unfortunate turn of events would not have been considered by the drafters of
I.R.C. § 2701 (1992) to be an abusive estate freeze. Therefore, penalizing those caught in this
situation appears to contradict the goal stated in the statute's legislative history of "allow[ing]
legitimate preferred stock recaps." Hearings, supra note 141 (statement of Jere D. McGaffey at 1-2).
I.R.C. § 2701(d)(2XC) (1992).
'' Id. § 2701(d)(2).
232 Id.
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year five the government finds toxic wastes on the land owned by the
business and the client incurs massive clean-up costs. No dividends are
paid for the next ten years. After the clean-up costs are paid the company
grows prosperous again. If the transferor lives throughout this entire
period and does not die, for example, until thirty years after the transfer,
the missed dividends will nonetheless be compounded, resulting in an
unanticipated increase in the client's estate."3
VIII. RULE 4-THE VALUE OF THE COMMON STOCK IS ALWAYS
TEN PERCENT OF THE VALUE OF THE EQUITY INTERESTS
IN THE CORPORATION -
4
As previously mentioned when discussing the classic estate freeze of
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the goal was to value the preferred stock
at the total value of the company and the common stock at zero.
Then, when the common stock was given to the younger generation and
a taxable gift was made, the value of the gift was-zero. Clearly, Congress
saw this as an abuse. The Senate Finance Committee Report, fol-
lowed by the conference committeeu 7 provided as follows:
The committee believes that the residual interest in a corporation or
partnership may have value in excess of current projected cash flows
because it cames with it the right to fture appreciation. The market
often gives substantial value to this "option value." Accordingly, the
committee bill provides for a minimal value for the residual interests in
a corporation or partnership. This minimum value, in effect, sets a floor
on the discount rate used in valuing the preferred interests in a
corporation or partnership that is not dramatically below the market rate.
" Id. § 2701(dX2XC). The damage of this section can be limited, however. One possibility of
limiting the damage in this case is to take advantage of a provision found m I.R.C. §
2701(dX3XA)(iii) (1992), which allows the taxpayer to pay the qualified payment and stop the
compounding. In the example above, client could have paid the 10 years of missed dividends as soon
as the company was able (say in year 18) and stopped the compounding on the missed dividends.
The election to pay past dividends is made on a gift tax return. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-4(d)(2), (3)
(1992). If the election is made on a timely filed return, the taxable event occurs on the date the
dividend is paid. If the election is made on a late return, the taxable event occurs on the first day of
the month before the return is filed. Id. § 25.2701-4(dX4). A statement containing certain information
must accompany the return. Id. § 25.2701-4(dX3Xiii).
i Actually, the junior equity interest is equal to 10% of the sum of the total value of all equity
interests in the corporation and the corporation's debt to the transferor and applicable family
members. I.R.C. § 2701(aX4)(A) (1992).
See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
' See Senate Report, supra note 142, at 59; 136 CONG. REc. at S15,861.
' H.R. CoNF. Rpr. No. 964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1990).
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Tis floor reflects the minimal coverage that a purchaser of the
preferred stock might require in the market for traded securities."
The statute provides that all jumor equity interest m a corporation or
partnership shall have a value of no less than ten percent of the sum of
the total value of all equity interests in the corporation and the debt owed
by the corporation to the transferor and applicable family members."
Junior equity interest is defined as common stock or partnersup interests
that are junior as to income and capital rights."40 In short, the statutory
rule is that common stock can be valued at no less than ten percent of the
value of the equity interests, including preferred equity interests, in the
corporation. The regulations state:
Minimum value rule-
(1) In general: If section 2701 applies to the transfer of an interest
in an entity, the value of ajunior equity interest is not less than its
pro-rata portion of 10 percent of the sum of-
(i) The total value of all equity interests in the entity, and
(ii) The total amount of any indebtedness of the entity owed to
the transferor and applicable family members.
(2) Junior equity interest. For purposes of paragraph (c)(i) of this
section, junior equity interest means common stock or, in the case
of a partnership, any partnership interest under which the rights to
income and capital are junior to the nghts of all other classes of
partnership interests. Common stock means the class or classes of
stock that, under the facts and circumstances, are entitled to share
in the reasonably anticipated residual growth in the entity."l
It is clear that section 2701 and the regulations contemplate the
possibility of more than one class ofjumor equity interest m an entity. It
is equally clear that it is these junior equity interests in total that must be
valued at ten percent of the total value of the equity interests m the
entity.
See Senate Report, supra note 142, at 59, 136 CONG. Rc. at S15,681.
SI.RC. § 2701(aX4)(A) (1992).
Id. § 2701(a)(4)(B).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3(c)(1), (2) (1992). The only commentator to address tins problem so
far states that Regulation § 25.2701-3(c)(1), if read literally, would mean that "the minority interest
discount cannot affect the rmnmum value rule." RICRARD B. CovEy, PRACnCAL DRAFTING 2893
(1992). Such an interpretation would be directly contrary to the congressional history. See infra note
247 and accompanying text. Therefore, it is unlikely that the words of the regulation will be given
a literal meaning.
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What is unclear is whether a minority discount242 is applied before
or after the ten percent minium. For example, in our simple freeze
where all the common stock is transferred to the children, assume the
cumulative preferred stock is also voting stock and the preferred stock
can outvote the common. 3 Is the value of the common stock ten
percent before the application of any minority discount, or after such
discount?
This critical issue is indirectly addressed by the Treasury Regulations
as follows:
(4) Step 4-Determine the amount of the gift
(ii) Reduction for minority or similar discounts. Except as provided
in § 25.2701-3(c), if the value of the transferred interest (deter-
mined without regard to section 2701) would be determined after
application of a minority or similar discount with respect to the
transferred interest, the amount of the gift determined under section
2701 is reduced by the excess, if any, of-
(A) A pro rata portion of the fair market value of the family-
held interests of the same class (determned as if all voting
nghts conferred by family-held equity interests were held by
one person who had no interest in the entity other than the
family-held interests of the same class, but otherwise without
regard to section 2701), over
(B) The value of the transferred interest (without regard to
section 2701)."
This regulation appears to authorize a minority discount, assuming
"class ' 4 means the common stock in our simple example. However,
the result could be different if the cumulative preferred were also voting
stock as in our example. It is then possible that the parenthetical phrase
m regulation section 25.2701-3(b)(4)(ii)(A) would mandate that the fair
" A minority discount is used when valing the shares held by a non-control shareholder in a
closely held corporation. This discount is necessary in a traditional non-tax valuation context because
of the high premium placed on control by investors. As such discounts may in some cases be as high
as 90 percent, it is a crucial issue as to whether or not the value of the common stock under I.R.C.
§ 2701 (1992) is detemined before or after the application of such discounts. For a discussion of the
issues associated with the calculation of the minority discount, see HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 250-
52.
The significance of voting rights in terms of the value of the preferred stock under I.R.C. §
2701 (1992) will be discussed mfra at notes 283-92 and accompanying text.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3(bX4Xii) (1992).
I. § 25.2701-3(b)(4)(iiXA).
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market value of the family-held interest required the addition of a control
premium, since it was all family-held. Under such an interpretation, a
control premium would be used in determining the regulation section
25.2701-3(b)(4)(ii)(A) value, and a minority discount would be used m
determining the regulation section 25.2701-3(b)(4)(ii)(B) value. Such an
interpretation is not likely, however, because the reduction in the amount
of the gift is the difference between these two values.2" Using a control
premium in the first value would increase the difference between the two
values, thus serving to increase the minority discount. It is doubtful that
the Service meant tlus interpretation to prevail when it adopted the
regulations.247
IX. RULE 5-AVOID BELLS AND WHISTLES ON THE PREFERRED
Long before the enactment of section 2701, a commentator stated:
Fundamentally, I look at a standard preferred stock as though it were a
Christmas tree. The tree is simple. It has straight lines. And it is easy
to understand. But then we start to put ornaments on this Christmas
tree, all lands of ornaments. We give it a low dividend rate, or a high
dividend rate, or a high call price, or we make it noncumulative, and so
on. As a matter of fact, we have so many ornaments that we can't see
the tree. I recently did a valuation of a preferred stock that was all
ornaments and no tree! But, I warn you, someone has to value the
preferred stock. If you insist on putting so many ornaments on tis tree
that it is not possible to value it, you are exposing your client to a
significant risk.'
Among estate planners, the various characteristics added to the
preferred in an attempt to support a value equal to the equity value of the
entity were often referred to as bells and whistles during casual conversa-
tion.
After Chapter 14, bells and wustles are to be avoided. They are
useless at best, and can be harmful. The basic rule of section 2701 is that
a put, call, conversion or liquidation right is valued at zero if section 2701
26 Id.
" It is clear from the legislative history that section 2701 was not to affect mnority and
marketability discounts. Therefore, it is likely that the regulation quoted above would not be read so
as to exaggerate the size of the minority discount through the use of an uncertain interpretation. See
Senate Report, supra note 142, at 61, 136 CONG. REc. at S15,681. "The bill does not affect mnnority
discounts or other discounts available under present law." Id.
" Rage, supra note 1, at 54 (comments of Robert M. Meyers).
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applies to the transfer2 9 The regulations group these rights as "extraordi-
nary payment rights" and include m the definition any similar right "the
exercise or nonexercise of which affects the value of the transferred
interest."' For example, a call right includes "any warrant, option, or other
right to acquire one or more equity interests." 2 Clearly, giving such rights
to the preferred has no tax advantages because they will be deemed to be
valueless.'
There are several exceptions to the rule that extraordinary rights are
valued at zero. The first exception is for rights that must be exercised at a
fixed time and for a specific amount. T Such rights include the right to have
the holder's stock redeemed at a specific price on a given date and a right to
have the stock redeemed at death for a cetain amount. 5 Excluding such
rights from the category of extraordinary payment rights means that the right
is valued at fair market value. Such a right will clearly increase the value
of the preferred, but only to the extent of the present value of the increase
resulting from the fixed price set for redemption at this future date.257
Another exception is made for nonlapsmg conversion rights25 These
are rights to convert the retained interest into a fixed number or percentage
of the class of the transferred interest. 9 To be excepted the right must:
(1) Be in terms of a fixed number or percentage of shares of the same
class as the transferred stock (except for voting differences);26
(2) Be nonlapsmg; 26'
(3) Be subject to proportionate adjustments for capital changes,
including splits;2 and
,,I.R.C. § 2701(a)(1), (3) (1992).
'* For a discussion of extraordinary payment rights, see supra notes 168-81 and accompanying
t* Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(b)(2) (1992). The scope of the quoted portion of the definition is
unclear.
252 Id.
I.R.C. § 2701(a)(1) (1992).
Id. § 2701(c)(2)(BXi).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(b)(4)(i) (1992).
Id. § 25.2701-2(a)(4).
For a discussion of the valuation of such preferred stock interests, see BRAw~M, supra note
45, at 208-14. A second exception is for a guaranteed payment of a fixed amount under I.R.C. §
707(c). I.R.C. § 2701(c)(1)(B)(iii). Tins exception is limited to partnerships and would not appear
useful in the context of estate freezes.
I.R.C. § 2701(cX2XC) (1992).
Id. § 2701(c)(2)(C)(i). These are not included in the term "liquidation, put, call or conversion
right." Id. § 2701(cX2)(C).
'o Id. § 2701(c)(2)(C)(i).
21 Id. § 2701(cX2)(C)(ii).
2 Id. § 2701(c)(2)(C)(iii).
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(4) Be subject to adjustments for cumulative and unpaid dividends
like those in section 2701(d).26 3
The important question is whether any of the exceptions describe
interests that would be useful in bolstering the value of the preferred and
be fixed in value so as to effect a freeze. The answer in most cases is
probably no. While both exceptions (for rights that must be exercised at
a specific time and for a fixed amount and for nonlapsing conversion
rights) might support a small increase in the value of the preferred, the
value of the right would be greatly dimished because of the impact of
discounting to reflect the time value of money.2" Moreover, even
though the right wluch must be exercised at a fixed tune and for a fixed
amount does have some value, there is considerable risk in using this
technique because the Service may view the non-exercise of the right to
be a gift from the preferred shareholders to the common shareholders.265
However, it is unlikely that such a failure to exercise would be a "taxable
event" triggering a tax on any unpaid distributions because the statute
requires a transfer of the applicable retained interest.2" The mere failure
to exercise the right would not appear sufficient to meet this test.
A similar analysis would appear applicable to the nonlapsmg
conversion right. However, because such rights are not required by statute
to contain a fixed exercise date, an appropriate discount factor could be
difficult to determine, making such rights more difficult to value.2"
Moreover, while it might support a greater value for the preferred, it
would not freeze the preferred's value since the preferred would become
convertible into common which should make the preferred subject to
appreciation.268 While it may be difficult for the Service to apply a gift
"' Id. § 2701(c)(2)(C)(iv). In the case of a partnership, the regulations define the right as "a non-
lapsing right to convert an equity interest in a partnership into a specified interest (other than an
interest represented by a fixed dollar amount) of the same class as the transferred interest. " Reg.
§ 25.2701-2(b)(4)(iv)(B) (1992).
' As an additional problem, even if it is determined that the conversion right does have value,
it is very difficult to determine the additional value of such a right. BiuHMm, supra note 45, at 540.
" Tus would be an extension of Pnv. Ltr. Rul. 89-07-002 (Nov. 1, 1988) (gift when controlling
shareholder of closely held corporation voluntarily did not receive a portion of the amount payable
on redemption of Is controlling shares); Pnv. Ltr. Rul. 87-26-005 (July 7, 1987) (failure to exercise
conversion right on convertible preferred stock held to be a gift to common stockholders); Pnv. Ltr.
Rl. 87-23-007 (June 15, 1987) (failure to take action to protect right to a noncumulative dividend
held to be an indirect gift). For an analysis and critique of the later two rulings, see What's Hot,
supra note 1, at 22-30.
', I.R.C. § 2701(d)(3)(A)(ii) (1992).
.. Id. § 2701(c)(2)(C)(ii).
'a Rage, supra note 1, at 57 (comments of Robert M. Meyers). This appreciation, of course, is
from the upscale growth potential inherent in a convertible security that results from the conversion
of the preferred stock into common stock. This conversion allows the holder of the converted stock
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analysis to the failure to convert, the Service could nonetheless argue that
such a failure to convert when the common's value is much higher than
the preferred constitutes a gift.269 Also, since the conversion right must
be nonlapsing, it could be argued that the preferred's value was equal to
the value of an equivalent number of shares of common at the date of
decedent's death. As a result of this potential downside, it does not appear
that such rights will be useful attributes of preferred stock.y
Bells and whistles on preferred stock are not only useless, (because
usually valued at zero) but can actually be harmful. This harm stems from
a statutory rule that if the preferred has both a qualified payment
right 271 and an extraordinary payment right,2' the stock is valued as
if the liquidation, call, put or conversion right was exercised to produce
the lowest possible value for all the rights.273 Tis "lower of '274 rule
is illustrated in an example provided with the regulations:
P, an individual, holds all 1,000 shares of X Corporation's $1,000 par value
preferred stock bearing an annual cumulative dividend of$100 per share and
holds all 1,000 shares of X's voting common stock. P has the right to put all
the preferred stock to X at any time for $900,000. P transfers the common
stock to P's child and immediately thereafter holds the preferred stock.
Assume that at the time of the transfer, the fair market value of X is
$1,500,000, and the fair market value of P's annual cumulative dividend
right is $1,000,000. Because the preferred stock confers both an extraordi-
nary payment right (the put right) and a qualified payment right (i.e., the
right to receive cumulative dividends), the lower of rule applies and the
value of these rights is determined as if the put right will be exercised in a
to participate in the growth of the company. In fact, most convertible preferreds that are issued
require substantial appreciation in the value of the underlying common before a conversion is prudent
from a financial perspective. HAMILToN, supra note 12, at 353-54.
"' If, however, the preferred stock carried a dividend rate greater than that of the underlying
common, the preferred shareholder would have an incentive to hold onto the preferred because its
value is linked to that of the common, but its dividends are ]ugher. In other words, if preferred stock
that pays a dividend of $5 per year with a par value (and initial value) of Si00 could be converted
into common stock worth S120 that pays a dividend of S3 per share, the holder of the convertible
stock would have an incentive not to convert because the fair market value of the convertible
preferred will track that of the common, yet the yield on the preferred is higher by S2 per year than
that of the common. For a discussion of the financial twist, see HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 356-57.
' Of course, if the dividends on the preferred are set at a rate much higher than what is expected
to be paid on the common stock, such rights may in fact be a source of value because of the
difference in yields. See supra note 269.
rn See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
2
a See supra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 2701(aX3)(B) (1992).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(aX3) (1992).
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manner that results in the lowest total value being detenmned for the rights
(in this case, by assuming that the put will be exercised immediately). The
value of P's preferred stock is $900,000 (the lower of $1,000,000 or
$900,000). The amount of the gift is $600,000 ($1,500,000 minus
$900,000).".
From tus analysis, it is clear that liquidation, put, call, conversion, and similar
rights should be avoided whenever possible. If they must be used, it is
necessary to consider very carefully what the impact of the use of such
provisions will be on qualified payment rights under the "lower of" rule.
276
X. AN ASIDE: RIGHTS THAT HAVE VALUE OTHER
THAN CUMULATIVE DIVIDEND RIGHTS
A cumulative dividend alone would probably have to be at a very
high rate2. to support a value of the preferred anywhere close to the
value of the corporation's equity.27 Therefore, we must explore other
attributes that have value that might be used to increase the value of the
preferred interest. Such rights include:
(1) Voting nghts; 279
(2) Liquidation participation rights;2 .
(3) Participation rights; 8' and
(4) Preemptive rights.2"
A discussion of these rights follows.
A. Voting Rights
Voting rights are clearly neither distribution rights nor extraordinary
payment rights.23 They are, therefore, not subject to section 2701 and
27 Id. § 25.2701-2(a)(5) (1992); see also id. §§ 25.2701-2(d), ex. 3, 25.2701-3(d), ex. 1.
", Id. § 25.2701-2(a)(3).
A rate higher than that of most small companies could be expected to sustain. See Rage, supra
note 1, at 56.
m Id. This is based on the fact that the value of a share of preferred stock, void of any upscale
potential, is valued as a function of its fixed dividend rate coupled with the likelihood that the payment
will be made. Therefore, the preferred stock would need a dividend rate high enough to support such
a value coupled with the expectation of actual payment. See BRIGHAM, supra note 45, at 208.
' See Slaying, supra note 1, at 157; see mnfra notes 283-92 and accompanying text.
no Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(b)(4)(ii) (1992); see Slaying, supra note 1, at 157; see wfra notes
293-99 and accompanying text. The other rights mentioned in Regulation § 25.2701-2(b)(4)
(mandatory payment rights, nonlapsing conversion rights, and § 707(c) guaranteed payments) have
already been discussed. See supra notes 254-70 and accompanying text.
n, See supra note 1, at 157; infra notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
2 See Eastland Outline, supra note 156, at 104; mnfra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
Voting nghts are not extraordinary payment rights because they are not liqudation, put, call
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are valued at fair market value." Voting power improves the value of
the preferred. 5  This increase can be substantial if the preferred block
has voting control. 6
In fact, voting is probably the most significant right with respect to
valuation left unaffected by the enactment of Chapter 14.2"7 It is highly
likely that the use of voting preferred will increase and may become a
standard means of increasing the value of the preferred. This likelihood
is augmented by the fact that little other than the cumulative dividend is
available to improve value.2ss Indeed, the voting right under most circum-
stances is the best potential attribute of the preferred remaining to
increase value.
The downside of using voting rights is that they will increase the
value of the preferred stock on later gifts or m the client's estate." The
client can no longer avoid this result by having the voting power lapse at
the client's death,29' as Congress has attempted to foreclose this option
or conversion rights or similar rights, as defined in I.R.C. § 2701(c)(2). Nor do they fit within the
definition of distribution rights found in § 2701(c)(1). Therefore, they are not valued under §
2701(aX3). I.R.C. § 2701(aXi) (1992).
' Curiously, the statute says nothing about how such rights are to be valued. The regulations,
however, make it clear that such rights are valued at fair market value. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(a)(4)
(1992) provides:
Valuing other rights. Any other right (including a qualified payment right not subject to
the pnor paragraph) is valued as if any right valued at zsero [sic] does not exist and as
if any right valued under the lower of rule is exercised in a manner consistent with the
assumptions of that rule but otherwise without regard to Section 2701. Thus, if an
applicable retained interest carries no rights that are valued at zero or under the lower of
rule, the value of the interest for purposes of section 2701 is its fair market value.
Even if this regulation had not been promulgated, it is likely that a close reading of Treasury
Regulation § 25.2512-1 would indicate that the valuation of voting rights would be at fair market
value.
21 Rage, supra note 1, at 56 (comments of Robert M. Meyers). This enhancement of value may
not be great, however, if the preferred stock is a mnority interest or if the number of shares of
preferred outstanding is small and if it supports its value with other features. Id.
' Id. at 56-57. In fact, "non-control" shares can sell at a discount of as much as 90% of the
value of control shares. With this in mind, it is clear that the value to the preferred if control is held
is significant. See HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 251.
, See supra note 286.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of cumulative dividends to meet the objective of sustainable
preferred share value is limited by the ability of the family corporation to produce cash flows
sufficient to meet the dividend requirements.
' This is because of the high premium that results from voting control. See supra note 286 and
accompanying text.
' The preferred stock, unless given away prior to death, will be included in the client's gross
estate under I.RC. § 2033 (1992). Of course, annual exclusion gifts of the preferred stock are a
possibility, depending on the age of the client, but if voting power increases the value of the
preferred, it will take longer to transfer it to the younger generation because of the $10,000 limit on
the annual exclusion. See I.R.C. §§ 2503(b), 2513 (1992).
21 This technique was made famous in Estate of Harrison v. Comm'r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1307
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by enacting Chapter 14.' Nevertheless, it is almost certain that the use
of voting preferred will increase.
B. Liquidation Participation Rights
Liquidation participation rights are described m the regulations 3
as "a right to participate in a liquidatmg distribution!" and are classi-
fied as "neither extraordinary payment rights nor distribution rights." 5
Given tis, one would think that these rights would be valued at fair
market value."9 However, the regulations prescribe a special rule for
these rights:
If the transferor, members of the transferor's family, or applicable
family members have the ability to compel liquidation, the liquidation
participation nght is valued as if the ability to compel liquidation-
(A) Did not exist, or
(B) If the lower of rule applies, is exercised in a manner that is
consistent with that rle.'
The source of this rule is unclear. Presumably it derives from the fact
that the right to compel liquidation is defined as an extraordinary
payment right,29 which is valued at zero.299 If the family controlled
enough votes to compel liquidation and liquidation participation value
took account of the family's control, the preferred would have to be
valued at the liquidation value. This was exactly the result section 2701
was enacted to avoid."0 The rule prescribed in regulation section
25.2701-2(b)(4)(ii) reduces substantially any value-enhancing effect the
right to participate in liquidation might have. This right may be useful,
(1987), and Estate of Watts v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 60 (1985), afd, 823 F.2d 483 (1lth Cir.
1987).
- I.R.C. § 2704 (1992). There is some argument over whether section 2704 is effective in doing
what it was intended to do and, if so, whether it is constitutional. See S. STACY EASrLAN, When
Congress Decided to Value the Family Going Concern as the Liquidating Concern: The Legacy of
.R.C. Section 2704, on A.L.I.-A.B.A. VIDEO L. RLy., ESrATE PLANNING UNDER Nsw CHAMrER 14
AND THE PRoPosED RGULATIONS 143 (June 13, 1991) (citation to transcript on file).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(b)(4)(ii) (1992).
"Id.
293 Id. § 25.2701-2(b)(4).
Id. §§ 25.2701-1(a)(2)(iii), 25.2701-2(a)(4).
" Id. § 25.2701-2(b)(4)(ii).
9 Id. § 25.2701-2(b)(2).
Id. § 25.2701-2(a)(I).
Id. § 25.2701-2(bX4Xii).
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but the valuation experts will have to judge its value on a case-by-case
basis.
C. Participating Preferred
Participating preferred is preferred stock that shares in the entity's
post-transfer appreciation with the common.01 This variation will
bolster the preferred's value because of the potential increase in the value
of the preferred that results as the company's overall profits increase. 3
2
However, since the preferred's value can grow, this technique does not
accomplish the desired freeze.0 3 Therefore, it is doubtful if its use will
increase.
D. Preemptive Rights
One commentator has suggested that preemptive nghts, 3°4 like
voting rights, are neither distribution rights nor put, call, liquidation, or
conversion rights and are thus valued at fair market value.35 This is
probably correct, but also probably not very useful for either corporations
or partnerships. The Service could cogently argue that preemptive rights
were worth very little in family corporations since it is unlikely that new
stock or partnership interests will be issued. Moreover, if new stock or
partnership interests are issued and the client does not enforce her
preemptive rights, the client would be subject to the same gift tax
argument made on noncumulative dividends and conversion rights.3"'
X. RULE 6-USE COMMON SENSE BOTH IN DETERMINING
WHETHER TO FREEZE AND IN STRUCTURING THE FREEZE
The estate freeze was always potentially subject to abuse. Commenta-
tors recognized this quite early,07 and these perceived abuses eventually
See HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 353.
Rage, supra note 1, at 57 (comments of Robert M. Meyers); Slaying, supra note 1, at 157.
Rage, supra note 1, at 57 (comments of John R. Cohan).
A preemptive right is a contractual arrangement between the security holder and the issuer
giving the security holder the right to purchase any new issues of the security subsequently issued.
See BIUGHAm, supra note 45, at 446.
Eastland Outline, supra note 156, at 104.
See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
3 7 See Rage, supra note 1, at 21 (Tarticular tax techniques can always be carried too far, and
it seems to us that the concept of estate freezing, somewhat like the concept of ESOPs, is being
recommended around the country as a palliative for almost every estate planmng problem.").
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led to the enactment of former section 2036(c)" 8 Estate freezes should
be evaluated carefully and realistically so as to avoid the enactment of
restrictive statutes like former section 2036(c), to comply with current
statutes like section 2701, and to give quality service to the client. The
first aspect of this evaluation is to choose the clients for whom estate
freezing will lead to an advantageous result39 as there are situations m
which it is not useful and may indeed be detrimental.10 One commenta-
tor has stated:
Tus is not to say that all, nor even most, operating compames should
recapitalize. Recapitalizations should be considered for all successful,
growing companes. Estate and income tax considerations, cash needs,
business growth, investment alternatives and other practical business and
family considerations, however, will be evaluated differently by
different business owners."'
It should also be noted that there exist many other estate planning
techniques that can be used as alternatives to estate freezing.312 Not the least
of these is the outright gift,3 assuming the client really wishes to give up
all or some control of the business. The purpose of this Article is not to
discuss each of these techniques. It is rather to suggest that techniques other
than corporate or partnership recapitalization may be more appropriate m any
given situation and that all available techniques should be considered when
developing a client's estate plan. Put another way, estate freezes in general
and business reorganizations m particular should be used only when they
make sense from both a business and estate planning perspective and when
they accord with the client's wishes and expectations.
The second aspect of a careful and realistic evaluation of estate freezes
is m designing the freeze once it is determined that it is the appropriate
technique. Always structure the freeze m a nonabusive form and do not be
greedy. Even with this m mind, it is necessary to ask what principles should
be used. What land of a freeze will work under 2701?
The answers to these questions lie in the recognition that section 2701
was enacted to cure only "potential estate and gift tax valuation abuses.'3 4
'' See Gazur, supra note 1, at 124.
See Rage, supra note 1, at 21-22 (introduction by John A. Wallace).
See id.
3,, Slaying, supra note 1, at 156.
S See, e-g., Cafeteria, supra note 1. Evaluating the effectiveness of these techniques after the
enactment of Chapter 14 is beyond the scope of this Article.
' See, e-g., Hamson, supra note 1, at 366-67.
Senate Report, supra note 142, at 58, 136 CONG. REc. at S15,680.
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The Senate Finance Committee, where section 2701 originated, took great
care to emphasize that the transfer of family business and most mtrafamily
transactions are legitmate 5 The proper techniques in freezing estates have
been practiced by better estate planners for many years. Nonabusive
techniques were not intended to be prohibited by section 2701.36
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of estate freezes is that almost every
rule employed in section 2701 reflects the practice of the better estate
planners in 1980. To show this, a list of the rules under section 2701 follows.
The list is accompaned by citations to a panel discussion held at the 1979
ABA annual meeting by a group of expert estate planners, reflecting their
prescient conclusions that the same niles should apply-
(1) Only a cumulative dividend can support a substantial value for
preferred stock;
317
(2) The preferred has value only if the dividend is paid; the dividends
must be set at a rate that the company is able to pay;318
(3) The failure to pay the dividend has tax consequences; 319
"' The Senate Report provides as follows:
Reasons for Change
Repeal of section 2036(c)
The committee believes that an across-the-board inclusion rule is an inappropriate and
unnecessary approach to the valuation problems associated with estate freezes. The
committee believes that the amount of any tax on a gift should be deterrmned at the time
of the transfer and not upon the death of the transferor.
Moreover, the committee is concerned that the statute's complexity, breadth, and
vagueness posed an unreasonable impediment to the transfer of family businesses. The
committee also is concerned that many taxpayers have refrained from legitimate
intrafamily transactions because of uncertainty about the scope of its rules. Moreover, the
current rules are ovennclusive because they apply if the transferor retains virtually any
interest in the income from, or rights in, the enterprise.
Accordingly, the committee bill repeals section 2036(c) retroactive to the date of its
enactment.
Replacement for section 2036(c)
While the committee believes that section 2036(c) is not the appropriate method of
taxing freeze transactions, the cominittee nonetheless is concerned about potential estate
and gift tax valuation abuses. Accordingly, the committee bill generally substitutes for
section 2036(c) a series of targeted rules generally designed to assure a more accurate
deterrmnation of the value of the property subject to transfer tax.
In developing a replacement for current section 2036(c) the committee sought to
accomplish several goals: (1) to provide a well defined and admimstrable set of rules; (2)
to allow business owners who are not abusing the transfer tax system to freely engage in
standard intrafamily transactions without being subject to severe transfer tax consequenc-
es; and (3) to deter abuse by making unfavorable assumptions regarding certain retained
rights.
Id.
)16 Id.
... Rage, supra note 1, at 37, 56-57 (comments of Robert M. Meyers).
' Id. at 37-38, 56 (comments of John R. Cohan and Robert M. Meyers, respectively).
Id. at 56 (comments of Robert M. Meyers). The panelists, quite understandably, did not foresee
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(4) The common is worth at least ten percent of the entity's value m
a recapitalization; 320 and
(5) Bells and whistles are basically worthless, except for voting
rights.321
Estate freezing m the 1990s will be very similar to estate freezing as
practiced by leading estate planners in the late 1970s.
CONCLUSION-WHAT GOES AROUND COMES AROUND-
THE DEFEAT OF JASON ?
Section 2701 of the Code is clearly not in its final form. Technical
corrections legislation was introduced in both 1991 and 1992."z Many
comments were made by organizations on changes to the law and on the
regulations as proposed before final adoption.' The Service is begin-
ning to issue private rulings interpreting section 2701.324 In all probabil-
ity it will take a number of years before the major issues involved in
interpreting section 2701 begin to be settled.
Indeed, there is disagreement over the basic issue of whether estate
freezes using preferred and common interests are still viable. One well-
the compounding mechanism adopted by § 2701.
3- Id. at 36, 50-51 (comments of John IR Cohan and John A. Wallace, respectively) (citing the
agreement of Richard M. Covey, another estate planning expert, on this point).
See supra notes 248-75 and accompanying text.
" Identical bills, H.R. 1555 and S. 870, were introduced in March of 1991. Both made numerous
changes in section 2701. 3 Fed. Estate & Gift Tax Rptr. (CCH), 1 11,850, 11,855, 11,860. Neither
of these was passed. Id.
3 See e-g., T.D. 8395, 57 FED. REG. 4250, 4250-54 (No. 23, Tuesday, Feb. 4, 1992)
(explanation of provisions on final regulations under § 2701); PS 30-91, 3 Fed. Estate & Gift Tax
Rptr. (CCH), 11,962 (explanation of provisions amending proposed regulations to avoid double
taxation). Pam H. Schneider & Lloyd Leva Plame, Proposed Valuation Regulations Flesh Out
Operation of the Subtruction Method, J. Tax 82 (Aug. 1991); PRAcncAL DRAFTrING 2604-2632 (Oct.
1991); PRAcIcAL DRAFriNG 2504-05 (Apr. 1991); PRAcrncAL DRAFTiNG 2355-2370 (Jan. 1991);
PRACcAL DRAfrtNG 2771-82 (Apr. 1991); Letter from Lloyd Leva Plame and others to Kenneth
W. Gideon and others dated January 25, 1991, commenting on issues on Chapter 14 that need to
be resolved by technical correction on legislation (copy on file with Law Review); Comments of
Pam H. Schneider on behalf of the American Bar Association before the Internal Revenue Service
(September 20, 1991) (copy on file with Law Review); Outline of the Oral Testimony of Pam H.
Schneider on behalf of the American Bar Association before the Internal Revenue Service
(September 20, 1991) (copy on file with Law Review); Letter from Lloyd Leva Plaine to Internal
Revenue Service dated May 1, 1992 delivering American Bar Association comments on Proposed
Regulations Under Section 2701 (copy on file with Law Review).
', Ltr. Rul. 9151045 (Sept. 26, 1991) (right of withdrawing partner to payments of $100,000
under partnership agreement is not an interest in the entity); Ltr. Rul. 9204016 (Oct. 24, 1991)
(determimng classification of several issues of preferred stock, use of subtraction method to value
gifted interests).
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respected commentator states the answer for most closely held businesses
is no because the rules are so onerous.32
If the preferred interest is noncumulative, the value of that interest will
be valued at zero in determining the value of any common stock
transferred by gift because the preferred interest is a distribution right.
If the preferred interest is cumulative, it must be valued standing alone
The result will be that even with a high interest rate it will be
difficult with most closely-held businesses to have the preferred interest
valued at its stated value. "Junk bond" yields may afford a comparison
as to what interest rate would be required to aclueve tius objective. In
addition, if dividends are not paid, the preferred owner's gross estate
will be increased by the unpaid amount plus a compounding factor
pursuant to IRC Sec. 2701(d) subject to a four year moratorium late
payment penod. Finally, the IRS must be apprised on a gift tax return
of the potential application of IRC Sec. 2701 to prevent the gift tax
statute of limitations remaining open on a gift of common stock.3"'
An equally respected commentator disagrees:
Because the preferred stock's value is tied to dividend rights, some
commentators argue that most corporations will be unable to issue
preferred stock under Chapter 14 because of inadequate earnings. That
view cannot be accurate with respect to operating companies. For a
hypothetical investor to purchase common stock in a family business a
fairly high rate of return is required to offset the risk and lack of
liquidity. This reqtured rate of return reduces the company's value. The
preferred stock has less risk and, accordingly, should have to carry a
lesser rate. Indeed, in most cases the rate should be substantially less.
Preferred stock of General Motors yields less than Treasury obliga-
tions.'z
Both commentators may be right. Clearly, it will be more difficult to
justify a high value for the preferred and it will be impossible in almost
all cases to have the preferred equal to all or nearly all of the equity
value of the company.32 But voting rights are still valued at fair market
value and minority discounts are still available. While the gift of common
2 PRAcrcAL. DRAFTING 2368-69 (Jan. 1991).
'u Id. at 2369.
S/aymg, supra note 113, at 156.
'n If for no other reason than the i0 percent rule. § 2701(aX4).
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associated with the freeze may no longer be zero, it may be within the
$600,000 exemption equvalent of the unified credit. Partial freezes
limiting the appreciation of the client's interest in the entity and reducing
the gift tax paid on transfer of the common as compared with an outright
gift of the corporation is still possible in many situations. Obviously, the
cash flow of the business must be carefully examined. The compounding
of dividends missed3 may daunt many estate planners. But the most
impressive evidence that estate freezing under section 2701 should still
be possible lies m the amazing correspondence between the practice of
the best estate planners in 1979 and the rules of section 2701.33 If the
best estate planners were doing freezes while voluntarily complying with
rules substantially similar to those under section 2701, freezes should be
do-able today. Abusive freezes probably will not work. Freezes that are
justifiable and realistic without considering section 2701 should work.
Section 2701, to a substantial extent, codified the methods of the best
estate planning practitioners m the late 1970s and 1980s regarding estate
freezes. Unlike former section 2036(c), section 2701 correctly identified
the source of the abuse in estate freezing as a gift tax valuation problem.
Congress attempted to prevent abuses while allowing justified estate
planning techniques. Time will tell whether Congress succeeded.
I.IC. § 2701(d)(3).
See supra notes 317-21 and accompanying text.
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